

**THE FEASIBILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN  
ACHIEVING HUMAN SECURITY: THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE  
POST COLD WAR**

**Percyslage Chigora**  
*Midlands State University*

**Rtd Lieutenant Colonel Niya Mtombeni**  
*Midlands State University*

**Abstract**

It is an existing reality that one of the leading threats to human survival in Africa is conflict, violence and war. The end of the decades of colonialism and Cold War had brought hope for the end of conflicts in Africa since most African countries involved in the conflict were battlegrounds as a result of the clash between colonial powers and the indigenous people and the subsequent East and West rivalry. Though certain conflicts came to an end, the situation did not change much as both inter and intra-state conflicts continued to dominate the political scenes in some African countries. The net result has been human loss and suffering exacerbating increasing threats to human security. Of great concern have been continued flow and manufacturing of weapons, both heavy and small, and the increased militarisation of communities in some countries. The logic to follow therefore is that stoppage or control in the supply of weapons through disarmament and arms control will go a long way in ameliorating the situation enhancing the achievement of human security. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the feasibility of arms control and disarmament in achieving human security in Africa. The paper will expose the major problems in effective achievement of arms control and disarmament and establishing ways of circumventing these problems with an overall objective of achieving human security in Africa.

**Introduction**

It is important to note from onset that it makes sense to think that the goals of human security, arms control and disarmament are undoubtedly worthy policy issues to follow given the continued suffering of people as a result of conflict and war. Central components are in two, one dealing with the ends and the other with the means. Indeed,

the attempt to turn the human security approach into the foundation of arms control and of disarmament is based on hope that the security of a human being as an individual can go further and enhance the security, not only of the state but the household, community, region and beyond. In the history of military, conflict and war discourses there has been failure to guarantee human security. In Africa the consequences have been equally disastrous with no hope that it might end soon. The paper submits that the feasibility of disarmaments and arms control in ending human security in Africa are largely oblique given the motivating factors behind the occurrence of conflicts and wars. The paper will attempt to critically review the success and failures of efforts towards arms control and disarmament. Failure, the paper submits, is as a result of the absence of conducive environment success. Factors for enabling success will be explored with the purpose upholding or dismissing the policies of arms control and disarmament.

### **Conceptual Framework**

There is a predicament in differentiating arms control and disarmament. According to Sheehan, these terms are used as if they are synonymous because they all talk about the solution to means of ending conflict and war, as a solution for survival, both describing means and end in policy the desired state of affairs and objective. (Sheehan Michael, 1988). These terms generally denote an alternative to do away with wars, conflicts and violence particularly as it relates to the military personnel and weapons. The attempt is to manipulate or remove the weapons in order to remove the drive or the expectations of attack and war.

It has to be understood that these concepts are different and have been through their, historical development evolved in terms of different approaches to the military

means as form of achieving security. Sheehan draws a clear distinction between these noting that the period 1999 to 1936 saw the significant efforts to achieve disarmament while years 1959 to 1986 were dominated by the arms control approach. (Ibid) He also draws an analysis of the period post 1986, where the two approaches arms control remained intact but the methods adopted emphasized disarmament (Ibid). The period after 1986 sought to integrate these two concepts no wonder why it makes it difficult at times to actually distinguish these concepts.

According to Kruzal (1991:249), Disarmament “envisions the drastic reduction or elimination of all weapons looking towards the eradication of war itself...based on the notion that if there are no weapons there would be no more war. Newnham and Evans (1990:73) view disarmament as both a process involving the reduction, removal or elimination of identified weapon systems, and as an end state it involves the establishment of a disarmed world and the prevention of rearmament thereafter. In itself, maybe unilateral, bilateral or multilateral and partial or complete, maybe limited to certain weapon systems or general and complete discount can be reached by being partial, or related to Certain Weapon Systems or strictly to one region or between two countries leaving after the countries not covered bringing severe weaknesses to transfers that might happen.

Disarmament includes a range of processes and measures by which the holdings, stockpiling and supply of weapons (including arms, ammunition and explosive devices) to states, non-state groups and individuals are reduced or destroyed. Disarmament measures include: weapons collection initiatives; weapons destruction and disposal programmes; decommissioning of weapons systems; arms embargoes; as well as

weapons moratoriums and prohibitions. Disarmament initiatives generally take place following a prolonged period of armed conflict, such as civil war, but have also taken place in countries without an immediate history of armed conflict. (<http://www.iss.co.za>). The fundamental aim of a disarmament process is to reduce the destabilising and destructive impact of weapons on the state, society and the environment. In this respect, a successful disarmament initiative can contribute to building confidence and stability in a situation characterised by tension and uncertainty. (Ibid).

In contrast, arms control, according to Keegley & Wittkompf (1997:461) refers to the agreements designed to regulate arms level either by limiting their growth or by restricting how they may be used. Thus it can be noted that the essence of arms control involves exercising restraint, in acquisition, deployment and use of military capabilities. Newham and Evans (1993:73) noted that arms control covers also measures that enable a statesman to conduct himself. In a more restrained way for example by developing techniques of crisis management. In fact, according to Institute of Security Studies, arms control is an all encompassing term that relates to those restrictions that are imposed on the production, development, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of small arms and light weapons, conventional weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear weapons. Arms control is typically pursued by means of diplomatic approaches and instruments, such as international treaties, agreements, as well as regional and sub-regional protocols. Arms control can also be achieved by means of national legislation and policy. (<http://www.iss.co.za>)

In general, the aims of arms control instruments and practices are to limit, reduce and prevent the proliferation and misuse of weapons, ammunition, explosive devices

(such as bombs, missiles and landmines) and weapons technology. In addition, there are a number of arms control agreements that seek to minimise the destructive consequences of armed violence and war, especially with respect to civilians and the environment. (ibid)

From the definitions provided, one might actually fail to see the difference between partial disarmament and arms control because they appear to be involving the same processes. But as Belchman (1980:118) explains a distinction could be found, because overall arms control is about the realistic management of political conflict rather about achieving some grandeur vision of people. It is all about the strengthening of the operation of the balance of the arms dynamic especially arms racing and technological development that tends to make deterrence more difficult.

Security means a condition in which the existence of something has been protected and preserved. (Naidu M.V, 2003). Human security (Its popularity in the present discourse does not mean it's a new phenomenon, it has its origin at the foundation the International committee of the Red Cross, popularised in the 1940s by the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of independence, and the Geneva Conventions) means a situation in which the life, the body and the well being of the human person have been protected (Ibid). The 1995 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme has necessitated present debates on the concepts. Human security is preoccupied with the need to protect fundamental human rights in which the basic threats would be murders, executions, genocide and war deaths. This become significantly linked to disarmaments and arms control as the aim is to control the occurrence of devastating violence and war due to the presence, abundance and misuse of

weapons. Naidu has noted that weapons were used in all the 42 ethnic and territorial conflicts in the world (Opicit). For Africa the situation has not improved with end of cold war conflicts. Though some have ended or are ending, new ones have emerged and have continued to threaten human survival and well-being.

According to Steinberg the concept of security is inseparable from modern nation states, which provides the only protection from a highly anarchic environment, and post-nationalist ideologies are a recipe for catastrophic warfare, resulting from the false belief that the state and deterrence have become irrelevant (<http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp539.htm>). There has been an attempt to overlook the importance of state as a referent point of achieving security especially were human security, often referred to as "people-centered security" rather than states hence the irrelevance of the state. (Ibid) However, it has to be understood that human security has to be looked at from the point of view of emphasising the complex relationships and often-ignored linkages between arms control, disarmament, human security, and development in general.

### **Arms Control, Disarmaments and Human Security Nexus and Tribulations**

Violations of human security in military sphere has been as a result of the availability and the use of guns, land mines, armored vehicles and tanks that are highly destructive in terms of infrastructure and human life. According to Naidu (1993:36), conventional weapons constitute one of the instruments of human suffering as a result of the willingness of human beings to kill and die with its origin in fears, suspicious, hatreds and alienation, and the ultimate resort to violence. An example can be drawn from a recent conflict in Democratic People's Republic of Congo were Ugandan army invaded DRC killing a large number of people, deeply affecting infrastructure and victimised

citizens and to include looting and illegal exporting of natural resources. (Tom Okello, 2005:25)

Given such a backdrop one would hail the initiatives towards disarmament and arms control. The major historical backdrop was conceived following the aftermath of the devastating effects of World War. Historically, it has proven that the enforcement of arms control agreements has been challenging and problematic. The reason for this is that the enforcement and effectiveness of these agreements are dependent on the commitment and consent of the participants to these agreements to abide by the terms of these agreements. There has been trends by nation which no longer wishes to abide by the terms of an arms control agreement, they tend to either covertly circumvent the terms, or terminate their participation in the agreement. More recent arms control agreements have included more rigorous measures to enforce the terms of the agreement, as well as verify the compliance of those states that are party to the agreement. (<http://www.iss.co.za>)

The problem of small arms owes its origins in Africa to the struggle for independence where against colonialism as well as the Cold War. Most of the weapons issued became difficult to control and account for. For example in the Great Lakes region the problem started in the early 1960s with the collapse of Congo largely known as the Katanga rebellion. Illegal markets for small arms have since emerged in Civil wars in Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan. (<http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Control/ArushaConferenceMarch00.html>)

In some areas, such as land mines and trade in small arms and light weapons, non-state initiatives can supplement traditional national security. But the Land Mine Convention, while an important achievement, the weapons in question are of relative

minor importance from a military security perspective cause catastrophic human security. However, this is not deny the a number of people who have been affected as a result of the availability of such weapons in Angola and Liberia for example a number of people have been affected by land mines. Small arms have contributed to the rise in armed related crimes in a number of African countries singling out South Africa as an example. Although various states have and continue to benefit from the cheap nature of mines, ignoring the massive individual human costs there has been a grown realisation that mines could not be viable weapons of war due to the massive collateral damage they cause, their indiscriminate nature and persistence have a wide-ranging post-conflict impact on the day-to-day experience of individuals outweighs the military advantage. (<http://en.wikipedia.org>)

Powerful countries can not be left out from the debate on land mines in Africa. For example USA has been cited as the major culprit. Critics of human security note the absence of the United States as a signatory to the Land Mines Convention as a critical blow to its effectiveness. This exacerbated the presence of the so called smart mines in African countries' conflict situations and as some have ended there has been catastrophic costs to human security.

Given the moral objective, no one will argue against disarmament and arms control. But in practice, the anarchic state of nature remains an accurate description of the human condition in not only Africa but also in many parts of the world. Kant's vision of perpetual peace, based on a common morality anchored in agreed norms that do not depend on the use of military power, remains a distant reality. In this certainty, such idealistic efforts have yielded very meager results, and have, at times, contributed to



catastrophe (Gerald M. Steinberg, *Ibid*). In fact, it has proven real that no one would expect state or state authorities/key leaders/ players to remain committed to multilateral processes or domestic controls when they perceive their vital interests threatened.

For Africa, private military intervention is one of the key external factors undermining the state and human security. This has largely threatened weak states and Fragile states in Africa. Private military companies, their partner arms brokers and local warlords are the principal actors in illegitimate resource appropriation which is a major cause of ongoing asymmetric warfare in Africa and the proliferation of weapons, (<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com>) and Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and DRC are clear examples.

A comparison between arms control and disarmament can be drawn based on the assumptions behind each of these means to doing away with war as threat to human security. The assumptions of disarmament lie with the desire to bring peace where it identifies war as the central problem in international relations. Actually war is a barbaric and illegitimate fool of policy hence the need to abolish. To abolish it is to abolish weapons.

Buzan also notes of the logic behind disarmament as the means of achieving security. Disarmament sought to deal with specific categories of weapons, which are deemed to be dangerous to human security particularly biological and chemical weapons (Buzan, 1987:237). This was the case with moves to ban use of biological weapons in the 1920s and which was fulfilled in the 1972 Review Conference of Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 1972 and the bacteriological and Toxic Weapons (TWC) which aimed at prohibiting the development of weapons of mass destruction. It banned the

development of weapons of mass destruction, the development of weapons of mass destruction, the development protection, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological and toxic weapons. The recent move in the field of the disarmament has seen the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) signed by 159 countries as of September 1995, which called for destruction of chemical weapons by the year 2003, and an organisation for the prevention of chemical weapons OPCW in The Hague was created to supervise the process.

Another assumption behind disarmament has been that possession of weapons by certain states makes a state more likely to resort to the use of force in times of crisis. Thus the unavailability of weapons means a hindrance to its ability to go to war. But a problem often develops that makes complete disarmament impossible since the minimum force is required for domestic purposes hence the objective behind the call for partial disarmament. With the emergence of several intra-state conflicts the weapons for domestic purpose have become instruments for threatening human security as the case of Sudan, Uganda and Sierra Leone demonstrates.

The continued existence of conflicts in Africa motivates anyone to understand the concrete reasons for failure. Firstly, according to Buzan, the concept of disarmament is flawed in its conception because it is fallacious to think of total removal of war and violence (Buzan, 1987:239). This is so because disarmament cannot get rid of the knowledge and technology that would enable states to rearm, nor can it remove the many civil technologies that would enable disarmament states that massive change or another. For example 11 September attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon in the US a complete destruction was done with purely civilian aircrafts without military bombs.

Such inform events need go inform Africa in terms of sophisticated developments that might fool people into addressing weaponry issues rather than a comprehensive knowledge based violence-unleashing systems.

Advances in biotechnology pose grave challenges to arms control for the coming decades if not permanent. The increasing capabilities of the biological sciences and the global spread of the underlying technologies raise the prospect of the use of these technologies by small groups or individuals with the necessary technical competence. (www.armscontrol.org). According to Chyba the challenges lie both in the mismatch between the rapid pace of technological change and the comparative sluggishness of multilateral negotiation and ratification, as well as the questionable suitability of monitoring and inspections to a widely available, small-scale technology (Ibid).

Chyba cited the reason why solutions to the biotechnology misuse end in a dilemma noting that they are five categories of risk. These are naturally occurring diseases; illicit state weapons programs; non-state actors; hackers; and laboratory accidents or other inadvertent release of disease agents. Particular measures may well address only one or two of these concerns, but they must be judged according to their impact, positive and negative, across the board (Ibid). For Africa this remains a challenge, as biotechnology experiments are taking stage in attempt to measure up to modern development standards.

Although a regime can be created to monitor disarmament a problem often arises that relates to verifications and provision of guarantees. Cheating is rampant. At most verification procedures can never be perfect that is the case also with recent moves to military power in Iraq. Again, the logic for total disarmament is totally unsound and can

never be realised because force may be required in local circumstances. According to Buzan B (1989:240) failure to have domestic capability that is strong enough will destroy some regimes as the case Somalia demonstrate/d. Thus attempting to discuss total disarmament is highly unwelcome politically non feasible.

Another economics logic is that it is better to disarm and avoid expending on military equipment and personnel and channel the resources non-military sectors such as food, shelter, and health and education provisions. This makes a great deal of sense when it comes to Africa as there are a number of development projects to be taken care of rather than boasting the defence budget. According to Naidu (1993:36) these conventional weapons are expensive which cause a heavy drain on budgetary resources. But this argument is not basic since it will raise economic pressures from those parts of the economy that depend on the military for employment and prosperity and also of the expenses that are needed for substitution international inspectors which require a lot of resources. For example,

“In November 1993, Pierre Falcone and Arcadi Gaydamak had allegedly helped arrange the sale of small arms to Angola worth US\$47 million. In 1994, they reportedly arranged a second deal for US\$563 million-worth of weapons, including tanks and helicopters. The Angolan government reportedly paid for the weapons with oil. The civil war in Angola has taken the lives of hundreds of unarmed civilians each year at the hands of both government forces and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Human rights abuses reported included torture, mutilation, abductions and killings. In 2001 alone, the

armed conflict and insecurity were responsible for 300,000 people being forced to flee their homes, bringing the number of internally displaced people to four million.” (Amnesty International, Opicit.)

Lastly, in terms of logic human nature ought to be viewed realistically. According to Booth, violence is inimical and as long as individual conscience does not place non violence as the highest stage of all the principles there is no notification that war would go away as history (Booth K, In Baylis 1975:3). And given that the international system characterised by anarchy it is difficult to imagine how nations with competing interest do away with the balance of power as a principal orderly mechanism. The grounds for the conflicts are as a result of the struggle for political power and a fight over natural resources or territory are other complicating factors this appears to remain as human interactions continue.

Given the failures of disarmament, concerns grew about what might be the possible organising principle of dealing with the problems of weapons and war. According to Sheehan, by 1960s arms control had largely come into force replacing disarmament as the organising concepts of negotiations. Arms control had its own assumptions that makes different from disarmament. The prime motivator for arms control has been that disarmament cannot be realised, arms race in 1930s, World War II development of nuclear weapons was the evidence. (Sheehan Michael, Opicit). Arms control, thus did not seek to ban weapons but control their use acknowledging the balance of power. Balance of power was deemed to be playing a stabilising role and war can not result hence it was the aim of arms control to recognise weapons or deployments that would jeopardize the stability then do away with them.

What appears clear is that arms control was in harmony with strategic doctrines prevalent that time thus indeed of doing any with difference, the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) it sought co-existence. To this relation Buzan has noted that arms control was necessary element in the creation and maintenance of MAD, its role was to make difference into means for turning arms racing tendencies between super powers into a mechanistic for enhancing the military status quo at levels sufficient for assured destruction. (Buzan B, Opicit, p.151). In essence arms control was geared toward reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence of it occurs and economic costs of being prepared for it. One is led to draw a conclusion that arms control maintained continuity with the older disarmament tradition by picking up its goals of reducing costs and lowering the probability of war.

Despite these welcoming insights what emerges in the late 1920s is that arms control failed as evidenced by the growth of arsenals, and privacy amongst super powers was continuing and new technologies were being delegated for example cruise missiles.

### **The future of human security, disarmaments and arms control**

Having realized the challenges bedeviling arms control and disarmament as a way of achieving human security in Africa there is need to find ways of improving human security through these policies. Great effort has to be available at the national level, individual commitments and community involvement and changes in attitudes the conflicting communities. At local level there is need for individual self-protection through enhanced public security, a reorientation of police training and greater co-operation among law enforcement officials in neighboring countries. (<http://www.ploughshares.ca>).

It remains that human security and arms control can achieve an immense deal by directing energies to strengthening free and functioning states. According to Steinberg democracies that share basic moral values are less likely to attack each other or engage in genocidal campaigns and this is so because democratic governments will recognise the value of cooperative security and of reducing the instabilities of deterrence thereby serving their own self-interest (Opicit). This is a fact for most African states where internal conflicts have been rampant; DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda just to name a few. As the case of DRC demonstrates the autocratic Mobutu regime gave birth to the contemporary conflict as non-representation has divided the society.

For biological weapons security lies in improved research by both national and international institutions so as to keep track and ahead of actors that might develop weapons leading to human security. As Steinberg noted, “By overseeing certain high-consequence research and its publication, we might therefore head off some of the worst misuse” (Ibid).

Solutions to the spread of military hardware for Africa need to be viewed within the framework of global standing and transactions. According to Amnesty International, European Union (EU) member states were permitting the transfers of military, security and police equipment to armed forces and security agencies that in turn use such equipment to commit serious human rights abuses or war crimes. For example, as Amnesty International reports, the enlarged EU will have over 400 companies in 23 countries producing small arms & light weapons (SALW). Such loopholes ought to be closed and a move be made to support generated for a legally binding global Arms Trade Treaty (Opicit) There is need to move further to provides original research and updated

information on small arms production, stockpiles and trade focusing on links between small arms and the abuse of human rights, policing and wider conflicts (<http://www.africabookcentre.com/>). This will enable tracking the availability of unaccountable weapons that found themselves in non-state hands such as rebel groups and militias. The EU has to be seen to be consistent in its action to stop human insecurity in African countries through stoppage for the supply for military hardware. For example, UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, in evidence before a Select Committee of UK Parliamentarians indicated that because of widespread and sustained human rights abuses by the Zimbabwean security forces and their armed supporters, the European Union (EU) introduced an embargo on military equipment to Zimbabwe in May 2000. However, double standards seem to rampant as The UN Panel investigating breaches of the arms embargo on Liberia in 2001 strongly suspected that a Mi-24 combat helicopter was illegally delivered to Liberia military. (Amnesty International, Opicit). Given such anomalies there is need to ensure all governments in countries through which arms pass (or transit) need to ensure the security of the arms transferred and whether the transfers meet the international obligations of the state.

A number of measures need to be put in place to deal with increased mercenary activities that have become rampant in Africa of particular mention are countries like including Papua New Guinea, DRC, Cote d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. This can have important consequences for the protection of human security, because mercenaries in various conflicts around the world have executed prisoners and committed other serious human rights abuses. (Amnesty International, Opicit). Domestic legislations are of importance in solving the issue, for example the 1998 South African Regulation of



Foreign Military Assistance Act is the most far-reaching national legislation dealing with mercenaries and private military companies in the world. (Amnesty International, Opicit). The Treaty of East African Co-operation adequately provides for mechanisms for regional co-operation. As Amnesty International have observed, at international level, Interpol as well as the United Nations need to be reinforced to deal more effectively with the problem and, by setting up a global network, to monitor the trafficking and control the illegal trade in small arms. (<http://www.ploughshares.ca>)

What need to be emphasised for Africa is that there is need for greater political will and commitment to resolving not only internal conflicts but inter-state as well. As Ploughshares has noted the armed forces as well as the national security forces of each country must be closely supervised to ensure that those issued with arms do not hire them out for illicit activities. Those legally issued with firearms should also be constantly monitored and reminded of their obligations as custodians of dangerous weapons. (Ibid)

In states where there is high demand for small arms like Uganda and South Africa were the rich; farm owners and business, want to protect their wealth there is need to reduce the level of small arms through education of the civil society, particularly the youth; creation of a gun-free zone; and a vigorous campaign against the transfers of arms to private entities (Ibid). This has helped in countries such as Zimbabwe that has tight legislation on the flow of arms to private hands. In comparison to Kenya and Tanzania were privatization policies of 1998/99 changed the hitherto strict legislation on guns control and ownership. Anyone who can afford a gun is now licensed. Illegal arms flow into Tanzania from Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and even from Kenya and Uganda through the Lake Victoria Port of Mwanza. (Ibid) Due to this the case of Tanzania depicts sad

developments three million civilians have been killed by small arms in Tanzania since 1990 and as Ploughshares has noted civic group,

“Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) lobbies the government to refrain from allowing free trade in small arms and light weapons; to stigmatize and mount a campaign among the citizens against indulging in private possession of small arms; to monitor trade agreements that make it easy to traffic in arms; and to inform churches through church newsletters, bulletins, magazines and electronic media about the proliferation and detriment of small arms and light weapons inside as well as outside the country. CCT intends to intensify a grassroots campaign through the Church network and appeal to colleagues outside Tanzania to share their material, financial and intellectual resources to sustain the campaign.”

(<http://www.ploughshares.ca>).

Another move that can help contain arms trafficking and their use lies with the cause for their need. For example proliferation in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region is attributed to a number of factors, among which are unequal sharing of resources among states or inequality of opportunities within states through favors to certain groups or communities. Small arms and light weapons can be removed from circulation by destroying them, by providing an alternative means of survival to people who have been dispossessed, through good governance and democracy; and by the effective policing of the borders, among other measures. (Ibid).

## **Conclusion**

Achieving human security through arms control and disarmament appears to be the greatest challenge facing African countries in their attempt to achieve human security that is directly caused by conflicts and war. Though it has to be accepted logically that ending the causes of conflicts appears is the easiest way of achieving human security there are deficiencies that exist when one attempts to implement policies on arms control and disarmament. As the authors have attempted to demonstrate and highlight arms control and disarmament for them to succeed has to be augmented by other policy measures. Circulation and proliferation of arms for Africa can be greatly reduced through poverty reduction, education and good governance. At national level arms availability and distribution legislation should continually be assessed and updated in order to cope with volatile situations for the present generation and the future. Where the legislations exist serious gaps between theory and enforcement as a result of lapses in governance in the state need to be addressed with overall aim of ensuring that the rule of law is adhered. Governments in Africa must ensure that national resources are evenly distributed and that no groups are marginalized thereby removing emergence of discontent and subsequent rise of rebellions. Regionally there is need to an integrated and comprehensive regional approach to control the proliferation of weapons through working closely with civil society in developing strategies to address the problem. The international community at large should reinforce the local, national and regional initiatives through avoiding manipulating the policies and regulations so as to fulfill their interest of accessing resources in Africa at the expense of human insecurity- death and suffering as a result of wars.

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