

VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMAL DIAMOND MINING IN CHIADZWA, ZIMBABWE

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ABSTRACT

The diamond fields in Chiadzwa have generated socio-economic and political struggles in Zimbabwe. These struggles are principally based on attempts by government officials, state security forces, prospective investors, unlicensed miners, global diamond governors, and other stakeholders to influence, control, and/or maintain access. These struggles are characterized by the use of lethal force by state security and policing forces in their bid to cordon informal miners from the diamond fields. Zimbabwe is characterized by the operations of an “informal diamond economy”, which is articulated to the “global diamond economy”. This explains the persistence of unlicensed diamond mining in Chiadzwa, despite global calls for a stop in diamond smuggling and trade in “conflict diamonds”.

Keywords: Informal Diamond Mining; Violence; Political Economy

INTRODUCTION

This paper derives from and extends Katsaura’s (forthcoming) work, in which he examines the miniature socio-cultural dynamics of informal diamond mining in Chiadzwa. Taking a macroscopic perspective, this paper draws on the case of Chiadzwa to examine the political and economic dynamics surrounding informal diamond mining and trafficking in Zimbabwe. Chiadzwa diamond fields have become a site of political and economic struggles pitting the ordinary citizenry, state agents, and global players in the diamond economy. The diamond associated socioeconomic exchanges and the attendant clandestine and shadow activities have created socioeconomic and political debacles in Chiadzwa and more generally in Zimbabwe. The state sanctioned police and army crackdown on unlicensed diamond miners has created a bloody environment, which has seen diamonds from Chiadzwa being tagged as “blood diamonds” by the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) (See Integrated Regional Information Networks [IRIN], 2009). The KPCS recommended immediate demilitarization of the diamond fields, with the view of stopping human rights abuses by government security forces (See Global Witness, 2009). Diamond mining and trafficking in Chiadzwa is analyzed here in terms of how they are intertwined with state violence and the informal as well as formal diamond cartels on the global diamond market. The focus is mainly on analyzing the contradictions and contestations within and between the national as well as global political

economies of diamond mining and trade and how these have produced, reproduced, and perpetuated informal diamond mining and trafficking in Chiadzwa.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The framework of analysis incorporates a number of concepts, including Althusser's concepts of repressive and ideological state apparatus. Repressive state apparatus involve the use of force or violence by the state to suppress diamond mining and trafficking activities (see Heald, 1980). Ideological state apparatus are deployed to control and suppress informal diamond mining and trafficking activities and they normally take subtle modes including the use of symbolic power or symbolic violence (See Heald, 1980; also see Bourdieu, 1990). The deployment of army and police officers to suppress informal diamond mining activities, while entailing the use of outright force, is also indicative of the exercise of symbolic violence by the state. Symbolic violence is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary without the outright use of force (See Bourdieu, 1990; 1977); and in this case visible policing in and around Chiadzwa diamond fields sends a message aimed at behavioral control, and thus, promoting conformity to non-entry into diamond fields by informal miners. The visible policing of Chiadzwa diamond fields is indicative of the presence of the state in the fields, and more so, of the symbolic power of the state; a representation of the state's power to regulate and punish. On the one hand the use of mass media to scare away (potential) diamond miners from Chiadzwa fields is indicative of the use of the ideological state apparatus, and also of the exercise of symbolic violence.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This study is largely qualitative. I rely mainly on secondary sources of data, including newspapers and academic research papers. Unstructured key informant interviews were also used to elicit information as well as verify data from secondary sources.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Chiadzwa is a rural area in Marange, about 100 kilometers southwest of the city of Mutare in Manicaland Province in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe (Katsaura, forthcoming; Sachikonye, 2009, 2007). The 66,000 hectares of diamond fields are in an area that falls under the jurisdiction of Headman Chiadzwa and the Marange Chieftainship (Sachikonye 2007). The livelihood activities of people in Chiadzwa and surrounding areas are undermined by adverse climatic conditions, which are not favorable to rain-fed agriculture. In Chiadzwa, rainfall is erratic and the people, called *VaBocha*, have always been subsisting at a marginal level. The *VaBocha* have been dependent on the cultivation of drought resistant crops such as millet and on animal husbandry involving animals such as goats and cattle. The precarious nature of the livelihoods of people in and around Chiadzwa gives ample impetus for the adoption of informal diamond mining as a livelihood strategy.

Informal diamond mining in Chiadzwa came under the spotlight in June 2006 and intensified in 2007 and 2008 (Katsaura, forthcoming). The year 2007 saw an influx of thousands of diamond miners and buyers into Chiadzwa in search of the gemstone. This increased the competitiveness of the informal diamond market in Zimbabwe with the effect of creating and sustaining a vibrant informal diamond economy. The informal diamond economy in Zimbabwe is driven by poverty on the

part of artisanal miners and gluttony on the part of the political and business elite who sponsor the mining and trafficking activities at huge profits. In Zimbabwe, like in other parts of Africa, informal diamond mining is propelled by the macro-economic, political and social challenges faced by the country. Such challenges are characterized by unemployment levels of more than 80% and runaway inflation of around 235 million percent as of July 2008 and unofficially estimated at over one billion percent in December 2008 (Human Rights Watch Report, 2009). The purchasing power of ordinary people in both rural and urban settings, most of whom are officially unemployed, misemployed, or underemployed, is therefore heavily eroded, creating a crisis of access to basic needs. This crisis makes the prospect of getting the US Dollar attractive to the rural and urban poor. Informal diamond mining provides such an opportunity.

In other parts of Africa, such as in Angola and Sierra Leone, Goreux (2001) notes that diamond diggers, who accounted for some 10% of the national labor force, were attracted to diamond sites by the hope of finding the big diamond which would transform their lives. Informal mining of precious stones and gold was undertaken by an estimated 13 million people in 30 countries globally in the late 1990s, with 80 million to 100 million depending on such mining for livelihood (Goreux, 2001). The informal diamond economy in Zimbabwe is driven by a political, military, police and business elite who use their access to authority as the basis for access to diamonds for self-enrichment (Human Rights Watch Report, 2009). According to Human Rights Watch Report (2009), diamond dealing and smuggling in Zimbabwe is benefiting the top brass of the military, ZANU-PF party politicians and those linked to them. This political, military, and business elite is propelled by what Bayart (1993) calls the “politics of the belly”, which in essence, is a politics of self aggrandizement.

In October 2006, after five months of government condoned open access to the diamond fields, the government deployed police officers to try and cordon unregistered miners from accessing the diamond fields. This attempt was part of a national government operation to stem out informal diamond and gold miners and dealers in a police operation called *chikorokoza chapera* (end of illicit panning and dealing). Police presence fueled conflicts within the diamond fields which then became an arena of fights, confrontations, and negotiations pitting police officers against unlicensed miners, informal buyers, and a host of other actors in the diamond fields. The police literally failed to flush out the diamond miners in a period of two years and the government unleashed the army under the pretext of beefing up security and flushing out unlicensed miners from the fields. In this case, the overt though seemingly not prime objective of the government in unleashing the police and subsequently the army may have been to quell informal diamond mining. It is important to note that the clandestine and more important objectives by politicians working in cahoots with high ranking army and police officials, under the cover of government operations, was to facilitate extraction and trafficking of the gemstone for personal benefit. The attempt of government to clear the diamond field of the poor informal diamond miners took a lethal turn when on the 27th of October 2008, the army violently took over the diamond mines using the air and the ground. The army officers fired live ammunition and tear gas on civilians found in and around the diamond fields. This heavy-handed attack toned down on the 16th of November after most of the informal miners had retreated from the diamond fields. Civilians were indiscriminately considered to be informal miners, sometimes mistakenly. During the army crackdown, more than 200 civilians were estimated dead as a result of shootings by army officers (Human Rights Watch Report, 2009). Anecdotal evidence in Marange suggests the presence of mass graves in which killed people were buried, and this suggests that the number of people who fatally fell victim to army brutality could even be higher (Human Rights Watch Report, 2009).

In its attempt to take control of diamond mining activities in Chiadzwa, the government mandated the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), which is a parastatal, to take charge of diamond mining with effect from October 2006 (Sachikonye, 2007). The ZMDC has a problem of a lack of equipment and is using rudimentary equipment with the result that the production levels are very low. The Minister of Mines and Mining Development indicated that, on average, the ZMDC produces about 50,000 to 60,000 carats of diamond per week. ZMDC predictions are that it can produce diamonds worth 600,000 US Dollars per week, if state of the art equipment is secured (Dube, 2009). The diamonds in Chiadzwa are regarded as having the potential to generate revenue, which can be helpful in financing the much needed recovery of the Zimbabwean economy (Human Rights Watch Report, 2009).

CORPORATE CONTESTATIONS

There are contestations among various global and local stakeholders as private companies and parastatals make claims and demonstrate interests in getting mining franchise. Some of the players seeking franchise or control are African Consolidated Resources Private Limited Company (ACR), De Beers, Zimbabwe Mining Development Company (ZMDC), Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), African Pearl Mining and Leview LCG, among others (Sachikonye, 2007). ACR is a British company and De Beers and African Pearl Mining are South African based companies. The MMCZ, which is the sole state buyer and marketer of minerals with the exception of gold, was briefly granted buying and mining rights for diamonds in Marange in June 2006 and in November 2006 mining rights were transferred to ZMDC. ZMDC then became the major rightfully mandated operator in diamond production in Chiadzwa, although the MMCZ remained with some rights to control and regulate mining activities and retained the sole buying rights until January 2009 when the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) also got buying rights (Human Rights Watch Report, 2009; Sachikonye, 2007). Sachikonye (2008) indicates that this cluttering of mining rights indicate the duplication of interests, salient contestations and scramble for the gem within parastatal, and by implication, government circles or structures. These contestations are reflective of the conundrum of political and economic governance characterizing Zimbabwe during this period.

Amongst the private players who are making firm claims of entitlement to the diamond fields is the ACR. The ACR had a contract to explore Chiadzwa diamond fields and this contract was revoked by the government of Zimbabwe in June 2006, soon after the publicization of the presence of diamond deposits (See Sachikonye, 2007). The exploration contract was never renewed (See Sachikonye 2008). Through its exploration, ACR claims to have discovered deposits of industrial diamonds in Chiadzwa, but gave no official estimates on the size of the deposits (Sachikonye, 2007). In light of the non-renewal of their exploration rights, ACR are engaged in a court wrangle against the ZMDC and the government of Zimbabwe, as represented by the Minister of Mines and Mining Development on the one hand. ACR are making claims for mining franchise, having made an investment during its exploration activities. Prior to the ACR's getting of exploration rights, Kimberlitic Searches, which is a subsidiary of De Beers, got an exploration contract, which commenced in March 2002 and expired in March 2006. The contract was not renewed and thus Kimberlite Searches could also make claims of entitlement to a mining franchise (Sachikonye, 2007). Chiadzwa diamonds are, therefore, a battlefield of contestations and claims for control and access.

The government of Zimbabwe has the prerogative of playing off one competing potential investor against the other. The issue of getting franchise is a politically charged one, in the face of ZANU-PF's rhetorical detestation of Western countries, which

it blames for imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. Sanctions are regarded by ZANU-PF as having caused the socio-economic and political crisis that the country has been grappling with. The contestations and claims made by the different stakeholders in the face of a stalemate of investment in Chiadzwa diamond fields is creating a gap of security, entitlement, and ownership, which is being exploited by informal miners. Miners are taking advantage of state ownership of the diamond fields, which is relatively diffuse, despite attempts at protectionism. The miners, therefore, cosmologically justify their entitlement to Chiadzwa diamond resources on the basis of the general perception of the state as a public entity whose parameters are fluid and in the public domain. The state has been synonymous to ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, even in the context of the government of national unity formed in March 2009 to involve the MDC in government. This has meant that unhindered access to and control of diamond resources revolve within ZANU-PF “partocratic circles” and patronage system. “Partocratic circles” here refer to the clique of ZANU-PF politicians and supporters. In this case, those who engage in diamond smuggling are linked to ZANU-PF political heavyweights and top military and police officials and this allows them to successfully flout the law and remain untouchable.

STATE POLITICS AND RESOURCE EXPLOITATION

Informal mining and trafficking of diamonds in Zimbabwe was facilitated by the political impasse that rocked the country between March 2008 and March 2009. Zimbabwe spent a year without a government, after the disputed 29th March 2008 harmonized Presidential and Parliamentary elections in which the then opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won the majority in Parliament against Zimbabwe National People’s Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF); but fell short of the required majority of more than 50% of the presidential vote. This called for a rerun of the presidential elections. On 27th June 2008, President Robert Mugabe engaged in a rerun of elections as a solo candidate after the MDC boycotted these elections, citing violence against and intimidation of its supporters and members as the main reason. The absence of a government in Zimbabwe meant that there was a state of anarchy which provided a window of opportunity for the informal mining and trafficking of diamonds. The “informal” diamond mining and trafficking networks that were created or strengthened during the period of political impasse have continued to be operative, despite the formation of a government of national unity in March 2009, by MDC and ZANU PF which are the key contesting political parties in Zimbabwe.

Diamonds have been associated with violence in Africa. The onset of informal mining of diamonds in Chiadzwa was accompanied by state sponsored violence against informal miners. In the fields there is also civilian violence among actors such as informal artisanal miners, robbers, and hawkers. In other parts of Africa, such as Angola, DRC, and Sierra Leone, civil wars were funded by proceeds from the sale of alluvial diamonds, which were extracted and trafficked by members of rebel forces. This is the reason why diamonds from civil war torn countries is considered as “blood diamond” by the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (otherwise commonly known as the Kimberly Process). Gheorghe (2008) states that the Kimberly Process considers “blood diamonds” or “conflict diamonds” to be stones that are produced in areas controlled by rebel forces that are opposed to internationally recognized governments. Blood diamonds have been used to fund rebel groups in wars in Africa, leading to more than 4 million deaths and millions more people displaced from their homes. Such diamonds were brought to the world’s attention by the media during the bloody civil war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, which left over 100,000 people killed and over one million people displaced. The Kimberly Process’s classification of conflict diamonds is context specific and does not generically apply to other situations in which the production of diamonds is

associated with conflict. It is against this backdrop that the Human Rights Watch Report (2009) indicates that there is need for the Kimberly Process to broaden its classification of conflict diamonds to include other forms of human rights abuses that take place in diamond producing areas that are not controlled by rebel forces. In this case, minute and localized conflicts and human rights abuses associated with diamond mining can also warrant diamonds being labeled as conflict or blood diamonds, as is the case with Zimbabwean diamonds from Chiadzwa. The militarization of Chiadzwa diamond fields by the government is one of the driving forces behind the rampancy of diamond associated violence and human rights abuses. This kind of militarization is categorized as constituting militarized commercialism. The concept of militarized commercialism is borrowed from Dietrich (2001). It entails the involvement of the army in controlling commercial activities and the control of informal trade in Diamond in Chiadzwa can be conceptualised as a form of militarized commercialism. This categorization is permissible in the face of allegations of military involvement in and control of the looting and trafficking of diamonds from Chiadzwa.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF ILLEGALITY OR ILLICITNESS

The perception that diamond miners are engaging in illegal or illicit activities or stealing from the state evokes debate over the various regimes of access to the gemstone that are existent in Chiadzwa. The labels of illegality or illicitness that have been passed on artisanal diamond miners in Chiadzwa are problematic and contested, given that they are a reflection of the locus of economic and political power. Constructions of illegality or illicitness are ideologically fostered by the state and reinforced via the use of repression, which is meant to scare diamond miners away from Chiadzwa. The classification of informal diamond mining activities as illegal or illicit implies that theft and violence are the conduits of access. The means that the mode of access to diamond resources by informal diamond miners in Chiadzwa is not considered as rights based. Rights based access is hinged on legally or socially acceptable claims for entitlement to resources. Legally acceptable rights of access to a resource have to be guaranteed by law while socially acceptable rights are guaranteed by custom. Important to note is that legally warranted rights of access to resources, usually but not necessarily, coincide with socially warranted rights of access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). This is capable of creating problems In the case of informal diamond mining in Chiadzwa, there is a divergence between the legal or state and social customary sanction for access to the diamond resources. In fact, there is a tension of interests between the government and the communities in Chiadzwa, the former opting for a protectionist approach that excludes the latter. The concepts “illicit” or “illegal” are loaded with derogatory connotations, which demonize and criminalize informal diamond mining activities; hence, this study adopt the concepts “informal”, “unlicensed”, or “unregistered” mining. This is because being in the unofficial sphere does not necessarily translate into being illicit. I conceptualise legality or illegality as social constructs that are power-based. Ribot and Peluso (2003) note that what one group calls theft can be considered moral or legitimate by others – an individual, a gang, or a neighboring community. In light of this, unlicensed diamond miners in Chiadzwa do not regard themselves as criminals and the criminalization of their activities can therefore be considered as an act of misrecognition of the miners by government.

The shifting and dynamic nature of entitlements and of illicitness or illegality of diamond mining in Chiadzwa is indicated by the way the government shifted the goal posts in its handling of informal mining. When diamond mining came to the limelight in June 2006, the government did not bar unlicensed artisanal miners from mining, but was in a way, supportive of

them. The Human Rights Watch (2009:3) indicates in the five months between June 2006 and October 2006 the government declared the diamond fields open to anyone to mine. Government officials, coming on Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe vehicles used to buy the diamonds, which were then relatively cheap in the absence of stiff competition from other players. The Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), which is a parastatal, also sent agents to purchase diamonds from the informal miners. Also, the RBZ purchased the diamonds in a way that can technically be regarded as “illegal” given that it had no rights to buy the gemstones (see Human Rights Watch Report, 2009). This means that the government was actively engaged in “illegal” activities and, in essence, it legitimized unregistered mining during that period. The miners referred to these days as *madays ebvupfuwe* (meaning days of plenty). During this period, the fields were not fenced and the regimen of access was tantamount to open access. Diamond mining took place in an environment where access to markets was limited and the appreciation of the value of the gem was low.

Informal buyers, who came to access diamonds, heavily shortchanged the miners who possessed the gem. In my conversations with them, some miners said that one would exchange three pieces of clear diamond for a bicycle, one piece of clear diamond for a pair of jean trousers, and one piece of black industrial diamond for a plate of *sadza* (thick corn porridge) and meat or for two packets of *maputi* (popcorn). At the end of 2006, the emergence of a relatively competitive informal diamond market in Chiadzwa in particular, and Zimbabwe in general, was seen and this increased the vibrancy and attractiveness of the informal diamond economy. The government, then, shifted to a protectionist stance, which saw the fencing of the 66,000 hectares of diamond fields. This marked the beginning of conflicts between the security forces manning the fields and the informal diamond miners. Such was the beginning of the criminalization of informal diamond mining.

STATE VIOLENCE

The Human Rights Watch Report (2009) documents the atrocious extra-judicial killings, torture, beatings, harassment, and arbitrary arrests that were committed by the police and army officers against civilians in and around Chiadzwa diamond fields. Commenting on the violent military seizure of the diamond fields in October 2008, the Human Rights Watch Report (2009) indicates that with the complicity of ZANU-PF, Marange has become a zone of lawlessness and impunity, a microcosm of the chaos, and desperation that currently pervade Zimbabwe (Also see Sachikonye 2009; 2008)

The police and army used lethal force against suspected diamond miners, often resulting in deaths. Such deaths have never been officially recorded, since they generally fell in the ambit of an underworld and partly because of their political implications on the government, the military, and the police. Some of the miners also indicated that the police would unleash police dogs on them. Relating to the diamond diggers’ experiences with the police dogs, which are popularly known as *Bruno*, one diamond miner said: “The policeman will simply say Bruno catch! [Commanding the dog to attack]”. However, the *Magweja* (informal diamond miners) would team up against police officers, killing police dogs and fighting against and sometimes killing, police officers using their digging iron bars and knives. These killings would sometimes turn into bloody feuds. If a police officer is killed, the other police officers would begin a hitting and killing rampage against the miners and make it very difficult for them to get into the fields to mine. On the other hand, if a miner is killed, the miners would team up against the police in a revenge mission. Although soldiers are feared by diamond miners because of their possessions of more

sophisticated firearms and fighting skills, some are also victims of the vengeance of miners. The diamond fields are, therefore, a localized and minute war zone of Zimbabwe.

The diamond fields are a market place not only for rough diamonds, but for many other goods. There is an influx of hawkers trading in different types of goods, including clothes, electrical gadgets, food, alcohol, soft drinks, and water. Electrical gadgets dominate the market and these include radio sets, television sets, electrical generators, and satellite dish sets, among others. The influx of hawkers is a response to the demand for these goods and services in the diamond fields. The prices charged are very high; an indication that the hawkers are taking advantage of the slackened perception of money by the diggers and of the general scarcity of goods and services. For instance, as of August 2008, a twenty-one inch Samsung Chinese-made television set would go for a minimum of 200 US Dollars, which is far more than double its price on the conventional market. Such a television set and other related products are normally disdained as of substandard quality and are normally regarded as *mazhing zhong* in local colloquia (the concept of *Mazhing zhong* refers to Chinese products deemed to be of poor quality). Such hawkers are normally women and some of them diversify their trade to include transactional sex. These traders are also vulnerable to the antics of *Magombiro* (thugs or robbers found in and around the diamond fields).

The twenty days of physical violence, perpetrated by the security forces starting on the 27th of October 2008, against the miners is construed as constituting symbolic violence. The operation was tag-named *Operation Hakudzokwi* (operation no coming back). Some of the soldiers who launched the onslaught were on foot (See Human Rights Watch Report, 2009). This resulted in the miners resigning into their homes as a security measure. One interviewee narrated his recall of the coming of army helicopters, popularly known as *zvikopokopo* by the diamond miners. He said that the army officers were calling for all miners to vacate the diamond fields if they wanted to stay alive. Police and army brutality is not just physical, but also symbolic in that it is a direct attack on the very premise of the miners' values and mores of bravery and audacity. Military violence against miners is, therefore, a form of symbolic violence. The mere presence of heavily armed police and army officers is symbolic in that it makes a statement against the miners, intimidating them into subsiding away from the diamond fields. This is, however, not to say that the violence that is aimed at countering the activities of the miners is all successful. Some of the miners mobilized their agency and devised other tactics of getting into the diamond fields. Such tactics include the bribery of the army and police officers and syndicating with them in mining the diamonds. Such avenues are, nevertheless, not at the disposal of many of the diamond miners, but are utilized by a few who could take advantage of their clandestine networks with some of the army and police officers to gain access to the fields. Such networks are part of the social capital that is at the disposal of the diggers.

The army and police attacks were a symbolic act of misrecognition of the diamond miners. It is a form of symbolic violence, targeted at dominating and battering the habitus of the diamond miners. The domination of the miners' lifeworlds got inscribed into their dispositional schemata (habitus), with the effect of proffering the legitimation of the presence of the army and police in the fields. The continued and prolonged presence of security forces in the diamond fields and their skirmishes with the miners, diamond buyers, and hawkers have become a part of everyday social practices in Chiadzwa. The navigation of these skirmishes have been habituated and routinized by the miners, hawkers, and diamond buyers.

Violence and coercion are also deployed in the exchange of the gem between the miners and local Chiadzwa residents, on the one side, and the security forces, on the other. In light of this, Human Rights Watch Report (2009) notes that Zimbabwe's army is using forced labour, including child labor, to mine diamonds in the east of the country. One interviewee complained that members of his syndicate teamed up with two soldiers to dig diamonds, only to be snubbed in the sharing of the exploits as the two soldiers took all the money.

The deployment of the army to flush diamond miners out of Chiadzwa is conceptualized using Althusser's concept of the repressive state apparatus. The army and police are part of the repressive state apparatus, which is deployed under the pretext of quelling informal mining activities. Following Althusser's analysis of the role of repressive state apparatus, the deployment of the army is conceptualized as aimed at facilitating the reproduction of the logic of capitalism. Capitalism is based on the expropriation of resources and the exclusion of members of the lower class. In this case, there was an attempt to systematically exclude members of the peasantry and of the working class, who had swarmed the diamond fields, from accessing the diamond fields. This serves the broader interests of reproducing the capitalist system. Althusser's concept of ideological state apparatus explains the use of the media to undermine the activities of the miners and to scare (potential) miners from going into the fields. The October 2008 army's crackdown on the miners was televised on Zimbabwe Television News and broadcasted on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation radio stations. This had the effect of undermining the propensity of diamond miners to return to the fields, controlling their means of symbolic reproduction and their schemas of thought. The ideological state apparatus can be conceptualized as part of the arsenal deployed by the state to embark on symbolic violence against partakers of the diamond mining and trafficking fraternity.

The fencing of Chiadzwa diamond fields by the government, coupled with the deployment and the continued beefing up of security forces, is meant to effect sanctions on (prospective) unlicensed miners and inevitably faces resistance from the miners. This is because fencing and the army and police protection of the diamond fields directly undermines the livelihoods of miners and are forms of livelihood shocks to which they continuously adapt. Government protective efforts and violence directly upsets the ontological security of people whose livelihoods are dependent on the informal diamond economy. It is against this backdrop that there is the persistence of pockets of resistance against the violent protectionism of government. Resistance and fighting back by miners challenges the hegemonic quest by the state to control the means of dispensing violence and coercion. Such resistance was initially demonstrated when the informal diamond diggers wrecked the fence surrounding the fields and created some entry points into the diamond fields. The rules of excludability that were being enforced by the government through the fencing and the tightening of security in the diamond fields are, therefore, undermined and circumvented by the miners who are rule creators in their own right. The principal rule of the diamond miner is the ability to flout the rules of excludability as enforced by security forces. Running and fighting are some of the principal rules of the informal diamond mining and are strategies of flouting, confronting, and escaping police and army onslaughts, which are aspect of everyday practice in the fields.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND (RE)PRODUCTION OF THE INFORMAL DIAMOND ECONOMY

There are some international measures directed at the management of global trade of diamonds. Such measures were put in place specifically to quell the trade of blood diamond. Global governance is normatively about disbanding power away from

hegemonic centers of power, such as states and overcoming resistance to liberal democratic values and procedures (Selby, 2003). The global governance of diamond resources is one such issue in which the state is purportedly undermined by international bodies and processes, such as the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and the Antwerp Process.

The KPCS was established in 2003 to prevent trade of diamonds that fund conflict (Global Witness, 2006). Clandestine trade in gemstones has fuelled decades of devastating conflicts in countries such as Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. The Kimberley Process is an international governmental certification procedure which requires each signatory nation to certify that all rough diamond exports are produced through legitimate mining and sales activity (Global Witness, 2006). All rough diamonds exported from signatory nations must be accompanied by certificates that state that the diamonds are produced, sold, and exported through legitimate channels (Global Witness, 2006). In order for a country to be a participant in the KPCS, it must ensure that no diamonds finance a rebel group or other entity seeking to overthrow a United Nations recognized government, that every diamond export is to be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate, and that no diamond is imported from, or exported to, a non-member of the scheme. After rough diamonds are mined, they are transported to Government Diamond Offices and the sources of the diamonds are checked to ensure that it is conflict free. The diamonds are then sealed and placed into tamper resistant containers and issued a government-validated Kimberley Process Certificate, each bearing a unique serial number. Diamonds from Kimberley Process Participants now account for 99.8% of the global production of rough diamonds (Kimberly Process, undated). Zimbabwe is a signatory to the KPCS and is therefore legally bound by its principles. This explains why the KPCS had to assess the mining of diamonds in Zimbabwe and then recommended the demilitarization of Chiadzwa diamond fields to reduce the conflicts associated with unregistered artisanal mining.

It is, however, important to note that despite the presence of the KPCS, rough diamonds from conflict torn countries and regions have been entering the diamond market. Robson (2008) shows that a report in 2007 by Amnesty International claims that despite the introduction of the Kimberley Process, "conflict diamonds" from Côte d'Ivoire are finding their way through Ghana into the legitimate diamond market. As Robson (2008) states, the brutal conflict in Sierra Leone has shown that even a small amount of conflict diamonds can wreak enormous havoc in a country. Control of the smuggling of diamonds is particularly made difficult by their small size and the highest value per unit ratio, which makes them highly attractive and lootable (Goreux, 2001). For instance, in 1999, one kilogram of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone sold on average for US \$1.15 million, which was the market price for 135 kilograms of gold and represented the earnings of two thousand Sierra Leonean civil servants in a full year (Goreux, 2001). Diamonds are also not detectable by metal detectors used in borders zones and airports and this makes it easier for them to be smuggled. The source of diamonds is extremely difficult to establish and this complicates efforts to police the origins of a given diamond, despite efforts that can be made through the use of gemologists (Goreux, 2001). Given these magnitudes, corruption is difficult to eliminate and embargoes on neighboring countries may not prevent smuggling, since diamond traffickers can modify their routing of smuggled diamonds.

The difficulties that the Kimberley Process has in the management and control of the informal trafficking of diamonds from Zimbabwe and other African countries are well mirrored in Duffy's work. Duffy's (2005) study of illicit sapphire mining in Ilakaka in Madagascar shows that there was a network of illicit sapphire traffickers, which undermined the quest for the global governance of the environment. Duffy (2005) used Reno's idea of the shadow state to analyze the ways in which illicit

networks present a challenge to global governance. Reno suggests that the growth of informal markets occurred partially in response to the decay of central state authority, especially in Africa's weakest states. He argues that the high-ranking politicians and businessmen (local or foreign) constitute shadow states that manage and control the informal markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (Duffy, 2005). These shadow networks manage to exercise significant political authority through the private control of resources in informal and illicit markets (Reno, 1995; Reno, 1998; Nordstrom, 2001; Nordstrom, 2004). Such clandestine circuits sustain powerful political and economic networks, and are often based on the exploitation of environmental resources (including timber, gems, drugs, and wildlife products), deeply subverting projects of global management and sustainability.

Another system for the management of diamond trade is the Antwerp Process, which was initiated in July 2000 under the auspices of the then newly formed World Diamond Council as directed by the World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB) and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA). In this case, measures were put in place to try and reduce trade of conflict diamonds from Angola and other states. Mechanisms, such as the use of certificates of origin and import confirmations certificates, will be used to censure trade of blood diamonds (See Picque, 2001, World Diamond Council, undated). The World Diamond Council was established by the World Federation of Diamond Bourses (WFDB) to find ways to reduce the number of conflict diamonds entering the diamond market. The Council began operating in July. The World Diamond Council has approximately 70 members, representing jewelers, traders, and manufacturer/producers. In addition to its members, the WDC has observers from the governments of Belgium, Israel, and South Africa and works with 35 independent governments, the European Union, and the United Nations to rid the diamond industry of conflict diamonds (AllAboutGermstones.com, 2009, Diamond World, undated). The word "Bourse" refers to a private stock, bond, or commodities exchange. Diamond Bourses are basically trading exchanges for loose, cut, and uncut diamonds. The largest diamond trading center in the world is located in Antwerp, Belgium, but there are also Diamond Bourses in Israel, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, and Shanghai. Almost 90% of the world's rough diamonds and about half of the polished diamonds are sold in Antwerp every year. The city is the hub of the global diamond trading industry (AllAboutGermstones.com, 2009, Diamond World, undated). The multiplicity of diamond dealers and governing bodies makes it difficult for there to be a singular or unitary approach to the management of global diamond trade. The loopholes inherent in the global governance of diamond resources provide opportunities for the smuggling of rough for conflict diamonds into the global market. Although, in principle, there is an agreement on the need to stop conflict diamonds from entering the market, in reality, some of the diamond bourses professing the principle end up tussling to grab diamonds which come from conflict torn zones in Africa.

Despite the labeling of diamonds from Chiadzwa as blood diamonds by the KPCS, they still find their way into the Antwerp market. This is spelt out and reinforced by the fact that Belgians are involved in clandestine trafficking of diamond from Chiadzwa. What this means is that diamonds from Chiadzwa inevitably find themselves in the global diamond polishing and trade center of Antwerp. The Antwerp process is a related, though separate, entity from the Kimberly Process and thus, there is no outright agreed position between the Antwerp Process and the Kimberly Process over trade of rough diamonds from Zimbabwe. This undermines the Kimberly Process recommendations, ordering a stop of trade in diamonds from Chiadzwa. Thus, upsetting the informal diamond economy in Zimbabwe is problematic unless there is consensus not just rhetorically, but also in practice among the global governors of the diamond economy. The disparity of approach to the handling of blood

diamonds from Africa between the Kimberly Process and the Antwerp Process is indicated by the fact that the Belgian mining marketing town of Antwerp continued to buy diamonds from the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), although these diamonds had been categorized as blood diamond (See Dietrich, 2001). The Belgian press quoted this report, which indicated that the sale of "blood diamonds" had continued despite the institution of a certificate of origin for diamonds originating from the civil war torn Angola (See Dietrich, 2001).

THE ENVIRONMENTAL NEMESIS

The violent protectionist approach of the Zimbabwean government in managing the diamond fields in Chiadzwa has encouraged a predatory approach to diamond excavation by miners. The fear and perceptions of danger that characterize unlicensed diamond mining has meant that the ephemeral extractive visits to the fields by diamond diggers are brutish and nasty. The miners are merely concerned with extracting diamonds and getting money because they are alienated from the diamond fields, which are state controlled, and access to which is based on notions of theft, violence, and confrontation. Thus the environmental considerations or consciousness of the miners is low and their relationship to the diamond fields is predatory. This has resulted in the creation of large pits, which are products of the indiscriminate digging of the landscape. Sachikonye (2007) shows that an official of the ACR is quoted as saying that during the diamond rush between September and December 2006, between 6,000 and 15,000 people were involved, moving one million tons of earth by hand, pick, and shovel in a 1.4 square mile area. This caused serious landscape defacement, which has continued to take place. The miners and other stakeholders patronized the field prey on the almost already depleted bushes for firewood, cutting available trees indiscriminately. Given the huge number of the people who were in the vicinity of the diamond fields which runs into thousands, the areas surrounding the diamond fields were overpopulated and the available resources overwhelmed. Firewood is the main source of energy, not just for cooking, but also for heating at night.

The environmentally care-free attitude of miners is indicated by one statement by one of the diggers who said: "We do not care about many issues. All we want is to get money and survive". Duffy (2005) observes a trend similar to and even worse than what is obtaining in Chiadzwa in her study of the impact of the "illicit" sapphire mining in Ilakaka, Madagascar on the environment. Studies by Duffy (2005) indicated that the "illicit" sapphire mining in Ilakaka has resulted in environmental degradation that has encroached into the nearby game park. Duffy (2005) notes "illicit" mining is supported and perpetuated through a shadow state in Madagascar, which means that it constitutes a key challenge to, attempted by donors and NGOs, govern the Malagasy environment. The shadow state is constituted of some political elite who are involved in the sponsoring of the mining activities. Moreover, illicit sapphire mining is often carried out in areas either inside or close to designated protected areas, thus posing a direct challenge to national and international attempts to conserve the environment (Duffy, 2005).

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of informal diamond mining is a reality that should be systematically handled by the Zimbabwean government. The government ought to redefine or refract from its reactionary and violent protectionist approach, because it has done little other than fueling bloody conflicts in Chiadzwa. The government needs to holistically address the roots of informal diamond mining and then address the concerns of unregistered diamond miners. There is a need to appreciate the

reality of the existence of informal miners and to consider factors that drive or attract them to Chiadzwa, instead of simply violently lashing out at them. The overall challenges in the economy and politics and the associated high levels of poverty in Zimbabwe are the major causes of the continuity of the informal diamond economy. Informal diamond mining is just a reaction by the poor and the gluttonous elite to opportunities for survival or self aggrandizement. The problem however is that the state, itself, has some stakes in the informal diamond economy, as indicated by the existence of government linked clandestine networks, which make underhand contributions to the sustenance of the informal diamond economy. The informal diamond economy and the mining communities in Chiadzwa have, therefore, been reproduced and mutated into different forms or modes as the overall operational environment has changed in the face of the unleashing of police and military officers into the fields. The diamond miners, therefore, have reconfigured themselves and transmuted their practices and strategies in adaptation to environmental changes.

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