

GOOD GOVERNANCE: AN ANTIDOTE TO CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

Samson Kassahun

Institute of Urban Planning at Ethiopian Civil Service University

ABSTRACT

This paper examines good governance as an antidote to corruption in Africa. Over the years, African governments and their institutions, , lacked the courage and will to enforce the law, procedures, and policies meant to fight corruption. As a result of this, corrupt practices have become common-place on the streets and highways, border posts and points of entry, educational and health institutions, government ministries and public enterprises, banks and other financial institutions; markets and religious houses; such that no sector or institution is sacred and protected from its corrosive effects. Corruption produces negative consequences of an economic, political, and administrative nature, which impair the process of development in Africa. This study has shown that the fight against corruption in Africa should go hand-in-hand with more general efforts to improve governance.

Keywords: - Africa, Good Governance, Corruption, Governance, Popular Mobilization, Private Sector, Civil Society, National Action

INTRODUCTION

Africa's quest for social and economic development has been tortuous and tumultuous. It has been characterized by missed opportunities, false starts, bungled planning and the downright plunder of nations' wealth by gluttonous leaders. The plight of the bulk of the populace has continued to deteriorate daily. Poverty and backwardness continue to stare at us boldly. Africa has sadly remained static. Illiteracy is widespread and national goals enunciated in economic planning programs have become as elusive and illusory as ever. What, emerges is a sordid picture of economic stagnation as reflected by piling up of external debts, poor public service delivery and unsatisfactory social services.

In the milieu of economic stagnation, the region has been witness to a spectacle of some selfish leaders unashamedly pillaging, with abandon, the continent's resources crucial for economic development and social progress. The resources have found their way to developed countries in the form of fabulous castles or secret bank accounts. In those countries where such looting by leaders has been common, local level and middle level officials have also jumped onto the bandwagon and partaken of whatever "national loot" has come their way. It has been a question of either getting on the gravy train or standing in front of it and getting crushed. High-level corruption has promoted low-level corruption, which has, in turn, fanned the growth of more high-level corruption in a self-perpetuating cycle of decadence.

For the vast majority of Africans, the scope, extent and the perniciousness of corruption is everywhere to be seen; experienced and lived through bribes at health centers, railway ticket counters, entry points and border posts, educational institutions, government ministries and public enterprises, banks and other financial institutions, markets and religions

houses, and in almost everywhere the public converge in search of services. It is such that no sector or institution is sacred and protected from its corrosive effects. The scourge of corruption has become such a public nuisance that the credibility of instruments of power has been put into sharp focus.

Acceptance of the state of affairs and resignation has become set in some African countries, making it more difficult to address the problem. This has further confounded the march towards economic development and good governance.

Much has been postulated to explain away the underlying causes that are generally held responsible for frustrating Africa's economic and social progress. Often times the blame has been laid at the door of external factors. Strenuous efforts have been made to downplay or even cover up homegrown factors that are the real source of the woes. One of these factors is corruption. Systemic and endemic corruption in Africa has distorted and undermined economic planning as well as the administration of justice. Corruption has influenced decision-making and subjected honest members of the public to injustice. It has contributed greatly to the frustration of Africa's efforts towards economic transformation and the consolidation of good governance. It is against this backdrop that this paper examines good governance as an anti-dote to corruption in Africa.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Corruption, like Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an acknowledged global malaise that pays no credence to race or geography. The pervasiveness of corruption in Africa is therefore not unique. However, what makes the African case particularly intriguing is the apparently high tolerance level exhibited by the generality of Africans to an otherwise despicable conduct. Whether because of distortion of values, conspiracy of silence, or outright connivance with perpetrators of the vice, the majority of Africans, it would seem, tend to treat corruption as an incurable cancer, which the continent has to live with.

Over the years, African governments and their institutions have exhibited lack of courage and will to enforce the law, procedures, and policies meant to fight corruption, especially among the elite; they mostly swept the incidents under the carpet and, thereby, infected the generality of the people. As a result of this, corrupt practices have become common-place on our streets and highways, border posts and points of entry, educational and health institutions, government ministries and public enterprises, banks and other financial institutions; markets and religious houses; such that no sector or institution is sacred and protected from its corrosive effects.

Corruption in Africa has become so pervasive that it has been labeled the "AIDS of democracy" which is destroying the future of many societies in the region. Today, it has a demonstrable negative impact on the development process in the region. Ruzindana (1998) has this to say about the negative impact of corruption in Africa. Corruption has led to bad roads and decaying infrastructure, inadequate medical services, poor schools and falling educational standards; and the disappearance of foreign aid and foreign loans and of entire projects without a trace (or their delayed completion leading to higher costs). Corruption has meant that fewer imported goods enter the country than were paid for; foreign exchange earned from exports is not repatriated; national assets are run down and repairs of buildings, equipment, vehicles, and physical and social infrastructure have been paid for repeatedly but never performed. Corruption distorts the economy through the waste and misallocation of resources. Citizens' fundamental needs – food, shelter, health, education are neglected. Thus,

corruption creates an artificial need for external assistance to compensate for corrupt and irresponsible mismanagement of local resources. Having created the need, corruption then impedes foreign assistance and investment. This paradox has formed the purview of this paper.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This paper seeks to:

- (a) Describe the extent of corruption in Africa;
- (b) Explain the causes of corruption in Africa;
- (c) Profile the impact of corruption in Africa;
- (d) Establish the relationship between good governance and corruption in Africa;
- (e) Illustrate how good governance can be an anti-dote to corruption in Africa.

METHODOLOGY

This paper is a theoretical review of existing literature on corruption and governance in Africa. To achieve the above objectives, the research relies on secondary sources of data. These sources include journals, textbooks, seminar papers, magazines, bulletins, newspapers and periodicals. Based on the collected data and review of related literature, interpretation, analysis, conclusions and recommendations were made.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

THE CONCEPT OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Definitions of governance abound in the literature. The World Bank (1998) defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. The UNDP (1997) defines governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. In this definition, governance includes but goes beyond the state. It encompasses the private sector and civil society. The UNDP believes that all the three sectors are critical for sustainable development.

The state creates a conducive political, legal and institutional environment while the private sector generates jobs and income. Civil society, by contrast facilitates political and social interaction by acting as the watchdog and by mobilizing groups to participate in economic, social and political activities. Any government that fails to take adequate cognizance of any of these three sectors will find the realization of good governance difficult.

According to Demeke (2000), governance is generally defined as the exercise of political economic and administrative authority and resources to manage a nation's affairs. Based on this, good governance could be taken to refer to the efficient and effective management of public resources and problems in dealing with the critical needs of the society. Good governance and sound public sector management constitute the major mechanisms for social transformation and the cornerstone of successful economic policy.

Our understanding of good governance accords with the definitions offered by the above scholar. It is the effective management of a country's social and economic resources in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, and equitable.

It is the process of social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community. To evaluate the observance of good governance principle in any situation, we need to find out whether power is legitimately acquired and reasonably exercised, benefits and costs of actions are equitably shared, and government is genuinely committed to the overall good of society.

ESSENTIALS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

According to Okafor (2004), by promoting the values of political participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, which are fundamental features of democracy, good governance must necessarily be equated with democratic government. Among the attributes of democratic governance are the following:

- Democratic rule, which provides for constitutional government and legitimizes division of power among the executive, legislative and the judiciary;
- Legislative oversight and independence of the judiciary;
- Transparent and accountable government and public service;
- Human rights, freedom of expression and association;
- Rule of law and equality of all citizens before the law;
- Predictable and transparent framework of rules, and institutions for the conduct of public and private business;
- Sustainable development;
- Active civil society (organizations) participating in public affairs under the rule of law.
- Demeke (2000: 71) identified the following as indicators of good governance:
- The extent to which the state engages in minimizing the incidence, containing the spread and mitigating the impact of civil strife and communal violence and institutes mechanisms for promoting peace, political stability and security;
- Among the preventive measures are equitable access to political power and economic opportunities, to all citizens; fair and equitable treatment of all regions and population groups in matters of public concern and the degree of decentralization of authority and devolution of power in the system.
- Establishing and strengthening the legal and institutional foundations of the rule of law and constitutionalism. The focus here is on the extent to which the key governance institutions of the judiciary, legislative and executive are functioning effectively and exercise institutional checks and balances.
- Effectiveness, equity and responsiveness of public agencies to the needs of all citizens. This indicator assesses the extent to which the public management system is perceived to be effective accountable, and transparent and have integrity.
- Popular participation in the political economic and social processes of society; this includes freedom of association and expression, existence of conducive and enabling environment for citizen's initiatives and activities and encouragement of the development of viable civil society organizations.
- The ready availability and free flow of information to permit informed public discussions on national issues and policies. This will make it possible for accountability to be practiced, laws to be fairly and correctly applied and watchdog institutions to function freely.

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

The physical and mental search for an acceptable definition of the term corruption has been the most difficult aspect of this study. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the most satisfying definition of corruption this author has come across is contained in the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. It goes thus: "Corruption (is) inducement to wrongdoing by bribery or other unlawful or improper means; a departure from what is pure or correct". It is also a pervasion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favor, or moral depravity; when at least two parties have interacted to change the structure or processes of society or the behavior of functionaries in order to provide dishonest, unfaithful or defiled situations, then corruption has taken place. It therefore involves the injection but improper transactions aimed at changing the normal course of events and altering judgments and positions of events.

A brief survey of the current literature on corruption reveals at least five different standards according to which specific corrupt actions might be identified; law, public office or duty, public interest, public pricing, public opinion, and a sixth, that describes systemic corruption (Kaufmann, 2005, Caiden et al. 2002). Each of these has its critics, and it is probably impossible for a single definition to encompass every form of corruption. But each of these general attempts of definition gives us some insight into different aspects of corruption, and also helps us to understand how today's environment has both provided enhanced opportunities for corruption as well as blurred its boundaries. Tanzi (1995) on his part defines corruption as the intentional non-compliance with the principle of arms-length relationship, which states that personal or family relationship ought not to play a role in economic decisions by private economic agents or government officials. The World Bank (1997; 24), on its part, defines corruption as "the abuse of public power for private gain". In popular understanding, any of the following is called corruption: asking, giving or taking a fee, gift or favor in exchange for the performance of a task or the performance of illegitimate task; hoarding, collusive price-fixing, smuggling, transfer pricing, inflation of prices, election rigging, illegal arrest for harassment and intimidation purposes, abuse, misuse or non-use of office, dumping of obsolete machinery or outdated drugs, illegal foreign exchange transactions, unjust acquisition of wealth, guided crimes, certificate forgery, false accounting and claims, diversion of public, corporate or other persons' money or property to direct or indirect personal uses. It is a price, reward, and gift or favor bestowed or promised with a view to perverting justice. However, in whatever way corruption is defined, it involves acts which are perceived to be against public interest or violate certain legal or moral laws and principles; and some of these are directly or indirectly harmful to the society. It is often considered as evil as it affects efficiency of the economic system. It also affects the success of policy implementation, which is crucial for progress.

TYPES OF CORRUPTION

It is pertinent to differentiate between the different types of corruption. Otite (1986; 12) identified five types of corruption in our society. They are:

- (a) Political Corruption: This manifests in manipulation of election, people and institutions in order to (gain or) retain power and office.

- (b) Economic Corruption: Business has been known to bid for favor to any level provided the economic cost of such favor does not exceed the returns and the value made possible by such corrupt act.
- (c) Bureaucratic Corruption: This involves buying favor from bureaucrats who formulate and administer government economic and political policies and who use their enormous power to delay and force people to bribe them.
- (d) Judicial Corruption: This plays on the relative position of buyers in the social structure and the use of wealth to secure police attention and bails and even to pervert the administration of justice.
- (e) Moral Corruption: The anonymity in urban centers has worsened or created conditions which favor moral depravity e.g. the desire for employment; the wish to show wealth through the acquisition of women, the flamboyant demonstration of materialism in the midst of poverty.

Oyebode (1999; 4) on his part classified corruption into four main types:

- (a) Petty Corruption: This type of corruption is usually associated with low-income workers who experience pangs of alienation, frustration and self doubt in their places of employment; more importantly, they are compelled to resort to corruptive practices very often in a desperate attempt to make ends meet. Supplementation of their income is effected through the creation of artificial bottlenecks and eye-of-the needle scenarios especially at public service points such as tax offices, motor licensing offices, passport issuing offices, etc.
- (b) Grand Corruption: In contradiction to petty corruption, there is also corruption on a large scale, more often than not perpetrated by government officials, senior corporate executives and others in positions of power and authority. One of the distinguishing elements of this type of corruption is its high potential for tremendous social consequences. Paradoxically too, corruption, when it involves the proverbial “big” men, is seldom visited with public sanction. Indeed, in an under-developed society, such as ours, status usually follows the extent to which a person could get away with impropriety.
- (c) White-Collar Corruption: aside from large-scale corruption by the ruling class, corrupt practice is also prevalent among the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. An under-developed economy provides ample room for graft and privatization of public resources by those at the middle or upper echelons of both the civil service and the organized private sector. The proximity of these grades of functionaries to policy formulation and implementation puts them at a vantage point to exploit knowledge of the impending changes in policy for their benefit. Insider-dealing, rent-seeking initiatives and other forms of primitive accumulation constitute the rest of the corrupt behaviour of this social class of officials.

Accordingly, public officers strive to corner public assets through proxies during the auctions, privatization schemes and similar activities while their counterparts in the private sector of the economy generally get by through an elaborate system of rain checks and favors aside from franchise, distributorship and discount prices which they allocate to their proxies, relations and business partners without any remorse.

- (d) Ivory Tower Corruption: because of the generally impecuniosities of the tertiary institutions, they might not be considered prime candidates for corruption. However, if corruption were extended to cover things such as abuse of office, favoritism, nepotism and other acts, which border on misconduct, then the universities, polytechnics and other higher educational institutions would not be immune to the vice of corruption. Broadly speaking, corruption as it relates to the tertiary institutions revolves around admissions and examinations, while cases of admission rackets are no

mercifully few and far between especially arising from acts or omission of the institutions themselves, allegations of sexual harassment, examination malpractice and denied promotions are regrettably, not on the decrease. In fact, anecdotes abound on campuses across the nations regarding money changing hands as well as other unwholesome exchange of goods and services for unmerited high grades and other favors.

Moody-Stuart (1994; 43-53) categorized corruption into two broad types as follows:

- (a) Grand Corruption: undertaken by state officials, often in collusion with large foreign companies, to secure the sale of goods and services of high value that would not have been chosen in a fair competitive or, proper prioritization
- (b) Petty Corruption: Involving small-scale individual activities of officials such as police officers, customs officers, stores officials, accounts staff, schedule officers in ministries, dishonest magistrates and judges, etc. Of the two types, grand corruption is more detrimental considering its enormity. However, petty corruption is more noticeable among ordinary members of the public.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study anchors on the Theory of Crisis of Governance. This theory maintains that corruption has significantly contributed to the failure of governance. The political turmoil and instability on the African continent illustrates the crisis of governance. There is growing political intolerance against the opposition, often times leading to bloodshed and the destruction of property. The military coups of Gambia (1994), Sierra Leone (1997) and the attempted coup (October 1997) in Zambia, all claim corruption of the government as one of the reasons for such action. The anti-government demonstrations, denunciation of mismanagement, public ridicule and loss of confidence have become a regular feature in various states in Africa (Africa Confidential, 1997). Crisis of governance theory attempts to explain corruption in terms of the nature of the state based on personal rule. It is asserted that, in such a situation;

Ethnic and/or factional affiliations tend to replace technical competence in hiring and promotion, and nepotism and corruption to replace impartiality in the exercise of authority (Sandbrook quoted by Wuyts et al 1992:93).

With specific reference to Africa, it is assumed, under the crisis of governance theory, that “such factional affiliations and resultant nepotism are inherent characteristics of African Society” (Wuyts et al 1992:93). These tendencies are reinforced by the absence of an adequate opposing force coupled with apathetic civil society organizations, which cannot exert pressure on the state. The lacks of opposing forces makes the leadership complacent and assume disproportionate power and authority. Such an environment does not provide conducive conditions for economic, social and cultural development but gives the state unwholesome power and authority. In time, there is a painful failure of state structures to deliver services. The disastrous failure of the state apparatus to deliver services inevitably creates anxiety and provides opportunities for private interests to develop and thrive uninhibited. Corrupt practices replace dysfunctional state machinery to become institutions to deliver services. The use of public office by private interests simply becomes a survival strategy. Corruption then becomes a way of life, which adversely affects availability of social services. This is the scenario that emerges in most African States.

MODELS OF CORRUPTION

Corruption has many facets and nuances in different cultures and societies. It is universally recognized as the behavior of public officials that deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends; and behavior in the private sector that breaches the public interest to gain special advantages. This study also anchors on five models.

- (a) The moralist-normative model defines corruption as inherently bad, as a lack of moral commitment and integrity among officials, and focuses on the negative effects of corruption on public morality, institutional discipline, and public trust of officials.
- (b) “The functional model” views corruption in the context of unique circumstances of every society. Thus, the concept of corruption differs in accordance with cultural heritage, political and institutional structures, level of socio-economic development, political culture, and the period of transition. In transition period, for example, political and bureaucratic institutions that are unable to cope with increased demands made upon them by entrepreneurs, businesspersons, foreign investors, and others may allow corruption.
- (c) The public office-legalistic model stresses the importance of creating legal institutions and making laws. Corrupt behavior is thus, based on deviation from rules against the exercise of authority for personal gain. One of the limitations of this approach in developing countries is the inability to enforce laws against the abuse of authority by those in power.
- (d) The public-interest institutionalism model seeks to explain how institutions shape individual officials and how collective and non-pecuniary goals are as much part of corruption as interest maximizing pecuniary corruption for personal gain. Thus, the prospects of corruption by the individual official are limited by the norms, structures, and capacity of the institution to which the individual belongs and therefore, the individual acts corruptly because of the fixed norms and conduct within the institution.
- (e) The Market-Centered model views every official as self-maximizing and entirely bent on personal gains. Self-interest drives officials to avoid their responsibilities and to use the rules to serve their own ends. The individual officeholder converts political resources into goods necessary to initiate and maintain corrupt relationships with those outside the formal political decision-making process. This approach, however, ignores the collective pressure on an institution and other limits of action and behavior by institutional norms and structure.

EXTENT OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

In recent years, many organizations have focused on creating measurement tools on governance and corruption. For instance:- World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators; Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index; UNDP’s *Human Development Report*; and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report, World Peace Foundation’s Index of African Governance Indicator¹ etc. Although the concept of governance is widely discussed among policymakers and scholars, there is as yet no strong consensus around a single definition of governance or institutional quality. However,


¹ The Index of African Governance is a project of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government's Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution and of the World Peace Foundation under the direction of Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist

following Demeke’s (2000: 71) indicators of good governance we try to see the existing governance situation in Africa using Rotberg and Gisselquist (2009) Index of African Governance Indicators.

Rotberg and Gisselquist (2009) have produced Index of African Governance Indicators based on five dimensions of governance: Safety and Security; Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption; Participation and Human Rights; Economic Opportunity; Human Development. By using the 2007 data and aggregating these five variables in one index, they have produced the 2009 Index of African Governance Ranking. Figure 1, below, shows that the top performers in year 2009 Index of African Governance are Mauritius, the Seychelles, Cape Verde, and Botswana. At the bottom of this year’s rankings, the worst performing ten countries are Somalia, the Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Guinea.

Other countries such as Ethiopia (37th) with score of 51.1, Nigeria (38th) with score of 50.3, Burundi(39th) with score of 49.5, Liberia (40th) with score of 49.4, Equatorial Guinea (41st) with score of 49.5, Swaziland (42nd) with core of 49.4, and Congo (Brazzaville) (43rd) with score of 48.7, in that order. Nigeria, despite its vast oil wealth, suffers by weak scores for safety and security, participation, rule of law, and human development.

Figure 1 Index of African Governance Indicators




Source: Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist, "2009 Index of African Governance Data Set," downloaded from /data/iag.html [March 19, 2011].

Good governance is essential for economic growth and development. According to the Index of African Governance Indicators, African countries can be classified into three categories such as those demonstrating steady good governance, those who lapse good governance, and those with questionable levels of good governance (Robert, 2007). However, when we look at all African countries, there is a high level of corruption in most of them.

EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

According to the Transparency International (2009) Corruption Perception Index CPI, despite the efforts recorded in some countries, corruption remains a serious problem in Africa. As per the report, 31 out of 47 African countries scored less than 3 (out of 10), indicating that corruption is rampant. Botswana emerged first in both sub-Saharan Africa and the continent as a whole with a global ranking of 37 and a score of 5.6, while Cape Verde was ranked the best perceived corruption-free nation in West Africa with a score of 5.1 and a global ranking of 46. Ghana came second in the region, with a score of 3.9, a global ranking of 69th. Other nations, namely Ethiopia a global ranking of 120th with 2.7 points, Chad (175) with 1.6 points; Sudan (176) with 1.5 points; and Somalia (180) with 1.1 points, were ranked in the bottom 10 countries on the list.

Figure 2 Corruption Perception Index in Sub-Saharan African Countries



Source: - Transparency International, 2010

Somalia, once again, features at the bottom of the ranking with a score of 1.0 as continued conflict and corruption trap the country in political and economic collapse, preventing structural reforms. Others scoring at the bottom of the rank, with 2.0 or less, include Angola, the DRC, Guinea, Chad and Sudan, all resource-rich countries. Despite their huge wealth and potential for generating domestic resources in terms of government revenue, these countries seem trapped into a severe lack of economic diversification, poor growth, rising poverty and inequality.

CAUSES OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

Corruption thrives in Africa for a number of reasons. In this section, we seek to discuss and analyze those primary factors and instruments, which have contributed, and continue to contribute, to the pandemic of corruption in Africa. The point of departure for this section is the fact that ethical leadership and, therefore, public accountability are seriously lacking in the majority of African states. Public accountability means holding public officials responsible for their actions. It is also central to good governance. Such a lack of real accountability has been regarded elsewhere as a major bane of Africa, which has bred irresponsibility among public officials and has further led to resistance and cynicism among the citizenry (Adedeji, 1995).

The first factor contributing to corruption in Africa is that of the total exercise by the ruling elite of all power attached to national sovereignty. This exercise of state power has led to the supremacy of the state over civil society and in turn to the ascendancy of the patrimonial state with its characteristic stranglehold on the economic and political levers of power, through which corruption thrives for it is through this stranglehold that all decision-making occurs and patronage is dispensed. As a matter of fact, in some African countries, no distinction is made between public and private interests and, government officials simply appropriate state assets. These are kleptocratic or 'vampire' states where the rulers and their associates loot their country's wealth as they wish. A good example is the former Zaire under Mobutu (David, 1980).

Such is the pervasiveness of the patrimonial state in Africa that the citizenry have adapted to it. Individuals, as well as those people in positions of authority and/or influence tend to shift their loyalties and political allegiances to the ruling regime of the day for reasons of personal survival and economic gain. The system of patronage therefore thrives, primarily because membership of particular groupings is a more acceptable qualification for a given position, for example, than an individual's actual capabilities. Under such circumstances, corruption tends to run rampant. It becomes truly ubiquitous, reaching into the private sector as well. It has now become a way of life in Africa for transactions at a governmental level, which seek to do no more than secure objectives that are not officially sanctioned and thereby corroding popular confidence in public institutions. The second factor is directly related to the first. Along with the emergence of the patrimonial state came the expanded role of state activity. Economic decision-making became centralized and public enterprises proliferated. This resulted in an expanding bureaucracy with increasing discretionary power, which was put to use as a conduit for graft. Public enterprises then became a playground for corruption and state intervention in economic affairs was the precipitating cause of such a situation.

The expanded role of state activity meant that the public bureaucracy was difficult to avoid in Africa. Whatever the transaction, be it getting a driver's license, telephone service, subsidized credit, tax administration decisions, government contracts for goods and/or services, or permits to sell crops, for example, it required the bureaucratic exercise of assumed powers due to the irrational interventions by the state in economic affairs. This, in turn, meant that bribes had to be paid for the transactions to be completed. Thus, corruption in Africa can be seen as an outgrowth of government involvement in the economy. It is that involvement that has allowed for the systematic exploitation of illegal income earning opportunities by public officials and the enhancement of rent-seeking opportunities. Incentives for corrupt behavior have therefore arisen in Africa because public officials have considerable control over the instruments regulating valuable socio-economic benefits and private parties are willing to make illegal payments to secure those benefits (Ayittey, 1992). For instance, more recently, the new government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) charged that the late former President Mobutu and his cronies had diverted some US\$4 billion into foreign accounts, businesses and real estate holdings (Time Magazine, September 7, 1992). In December 1996, President Mkapa of Tanzania released the report of the Warioba Commission against corruption, which documents, in great detail, the nature and extent of corruption in Tanzania. The report painted a picture of an oppressed people largely at the mercy of an incompetent and very corrupt state bureaucracy.

In addition to bribes, the expanded role of state activity also provided additional opportunities for embezzlement and unlawful enrichment. Many African leaders and other government officials have been frequently exposed and shown to be in control of wealth and significant assets that are disproportionate to their official earnings. A good litany of the country evidence on this aspect of corruption can be found everywhere. Suffice it to say here that Africa represents the classic example of a kleptocracy *par excellence*. It is not surprising therefore, that it is this aspect of corruption that is most often cited as the justification for the unceremonial removal of African governments from office by the military (Uneke, 2010).

The third factor contributing to corruption in Africa stems from the second. Africa's encounter with centralized economic decision-making and increasing state activity has been catastrophic, to say the least. This encounter has resulted in economic retardation and elusive development. This, in turn, has created a situation where the great majority of African countries are now among the poorest in the world. Public officials, who are among those experiencing the effects of the hardships associated with these retrogressive economic conditions, have tended to pursue corrupt activities to maintain their living standards or to simply make ends meet (transparency International, 2006).

One of the primary results of the deteriorating economic situation in Africa has been the erosion and compression of salaries of public officials (Mbaku, 1998). In such circumstances, quite apart from their declining motivation and efficiency, public officials in Africa disavow any remaining sense of civic virtue and attempt to supplement their incomes by engaging in corrupt acts. Such acts, although justified in the mind-set of the public officials who are engaged in them, are, nonetheless, corrosive and tend to do economic harm and exacerbate the economic decline of their countries.

The fourth factor contributing to corruption in Africa is the lack of the rule of law and of administrative predictability (Mojtabal, 2006). This factor, important as it is, on its own merits, takes on added importance in the context of the patrimonial state as will be shown shortly. Predictability and the rule of law are characterized by policies and regulations developed and implemented according to a regular process, which is institutionalized and which provides opportunities for review.

However, in patrimonial states, such as those in Africa, the formal bureaucratic organizations are captured by the ruling regime which then uses, or interferes with the powers and functions of government for private gain. This capture includes control over the state instruments for law and order (McCarthy, 1994). Such a state of affairs affords considerable discretion in decision-making and produces irrational decisions that may be illegal but which cannot be challenged in the courts. Under such circumstances, corruption not only thrives but is also more likely to go unpunished.

In Zimbabwe, for example, an exercise to detect and punish those public officials involved in an elaborate scheme to purchase and resell motor vehicles illegally became a farce when the first government minister to be convicted in the affair was pardoned by the President. The Attorney-General subsequently dropped all charges against the other government ministers and members of parliament on the grounds that they would be pardoned by the President if convicted. A further example of the lack of the rule of law contributing to corruption can be obtained from the Democratic Republic of the Congo whose late former President Mobutu had overseas bank accounts known to be stuffed with pilfered state funds (Uneke, 2010).

The next factor contributing to corruption in Africa is the considerable lack of exemplary ethical leadership exhibited by politicians and senior public officials. Indeed, the lack of the rule of law automatically suggests that exemplary public leadership would be difficult to find in Africa. This lack of exemplary ethical leadership in most of Africa can be attributed to the fact that personal and private interests take precedence over national interests. The state is often an artificial entity. Consequently, public officials have no fear of being held accountable for their actions. They disobey rules and directives and they display a considerable knack for disregarding their responsibilities. In other words, they tend not to exhibit a public service ethic (Mbaku, 1998).

When leadership is not ethical, it provides encouragement for corruption to occur. This, in turn, shapes the attitudes and patterns of ethical behavior of each level of subordinates. However, when leaders are recognized for their integrity and concern for the public welfare, these qualities can be reflected in the ethos and performance of the public service and will also have a profound effect on all sections of society. Nevertheless, if corruption is rife, the public bureaucracy is likely to become demoralized and self-serving (World Bank, 1993). In Nigeria, for example, the lack of exemplary ethical leadership has contributed to a fragmentation of political life, which continues to channel public service loyalty away from the policy process and the abstract state back to themselves in a gross display of corruption (The Guardian, August 29, 1999).

The final factor has to do with socio-cultural norms. In Africa, the widespread existence of personalization results in significant loyalties toward one's family, tribe, and friends. Such loyalties are at the expense of loyalty to the state for they often require the contravention of rules and regulations to maintain them. Corruption is therefore advanced by attitudes and patterns of behavior interwoven throughout the whole socio-cultural fabric.

Socio-cultural norms may be difficult to grasp in the African context. However, such norms remain as very influential forces in day-to-day African life. They often determine, for example, who is appointed to jobs; who is promoted; who wins government contracts, and so on. In other words, they have a great deal to do with the organization of life in general, and they are a major source of nepotism and corruption in public life. They breed favoritism and the creation of corrupt social networks within the administrative system.

Gift giving is a formal valued aspect of African tradition. Gifts may serve as informal symbols of expected gratitude for benevolence received. This may take the form of money, cloth, farm produce, and animals and so on. It signifies gratitude on the part of a receiver of a benevolent act, or on behalf of such a person by friends or relatives. It should however, be noted that while culture of patronage and gift giving may be seen as creating favorable environment for corruption, this does not in any way indicate that people generally mistake corrupt practices for culture of gift giving. Indeed, people do distinguish between appropriate traditional behaviour and corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

There are generally three types of consequences of corruption in developing states and the African countries are no exception. Corruption produces negative consequences of an economic, political, and administrative nature. These consequences, both individually and collectively, categorically impair the process of development in Africa.

First, we look at the economic consequences. Corruption increases the cost to African governments of doing business. Kickbacks and illegal commissions, which have to be paid to public officials, are simply added to the final costs of contracts, equipment, supplies and so on. This not only increases government expenditures and siphons off scarce funds, but eventually leads to the need to increase revenues either through higher taxes, or by borrowing or by reducing development programs of great importance and, ultimately, to a general welfare loss, lower growth, and macroeconomic distortions for the affected country.

In some African countries, corrupt politicians choose investment projects not because of their intrinsic economic worth, but on the opportunity for bribes and kickbacks, these projects present. The enterprise that pays the commission rarely suffers from the payment of the bribe since it is recoverable in the overall costing of the project either through overpricing, cost adjustment during the term of the project, or by tampering with the quality of the work performed or materials used (Tanzi, 1998). Taxpayers therefore end up with a more costly project to begin with, or a project of inferior quality that would require costly upkeep. This reduces the productivity of capital spending, which, in turn, hampers growth. Tanzi (1998) has also found that high-level corruption in public investment can reduce growth by decreasing the government revenue needed to finance productive spending.

In the trade sector, corruption results in capital flight and price increases at both the wholesale and retail levels. Corruption in the trade sector is perhaps the most systematic of the corrupt activities in Africa. The role of trade in African states, and hence, the importance of the import-export sector, loom large and provide many opportunities for corrupt practices to be perpetrated. Bribes have to be paid; for the clearance of goods through customs, for obtaining import licenses, for the shipping of contraband, for exclusion from taxes and fees and so on.

It is estimated by the UN Economic Commission for Africa that Africa's stock of flight capital is US\$148 billion (UNECA, 2006). A recent study indicates that Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and Rwanda are seriously plagued by the capital flight problem (Ajayi, 1997). Undoubtedly, some of this capital flight represents legitimate transfers abroad. However, the great majority is derived from corrupt activities involving public officials. Since capital is scarce in Africa and is much needed to bolster the development effort, its outflow from the region, on a large scale, is a very disturbing matter.

Capital flight can be regarded as a diversion of resources from domestic real investment to foreign financial investments. The country of origin loses the associated benefits of such capital even if the yield from such capital were to be repatriated in the future. The loss of benefits includes income as well as tax revenues. In addition, there is the consequence of the redistribution of wealth from country of origin to country of destination. Capital flight is to be avoided because of its micro and macro impact on development. It destabilizes interest rates and exchange rates, it reflects discrepancies between private and social rates of return, it contributes to erosion of the domestic tax base, it reduces domestic investment, and it necessitates increases in foreign borrowing, which in turn, increase the national cost of borrowing.

Corruption also stifles initiative and enterprise in Africa. Rent-seeking activities tend to have the effect of inflating the cost of doing business (Mbaku, 1992). The immediate consequences of such a situation is that entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs withdraw from engaging in such investments and the affected economy loses the multiplier benefits that would have been forthcoming with those investments. Corruption therefore slows down investment and economic growth either by crowding out productive investment directly or through the uncertainty created by bribery contracts that are not governed by formal property rights and are therefore not enforceable. Corruption, in this sense, can be seen as a tax, which increases risk and reduces the incentive to invest, over the longer term. Any economy infested with corruption will also suffer from its effects of discouraging potential foreign investors and aid donors.

Finally, with respect to the economic consequences, corruption also impairs economic efficiency in Africa (Belaye, 2009, Uneke, 2010, Hope, 2000, Frisch, 1995.) As an example, financial gains obtained through corruption are unlikely to be transferred to the investment sector since ill-gotten money is either used up in conspicuous consumption or is transferred to foreign bank accounts. Furthermore, bribes, commissions, or kickbacks result in wasteful expenditure, usually on suspect projects. The commitment of such expenditure eliminates what would have been viable and cost-efficient alternatives. The second type of consequence of corruption in Africa relates to political development and stability (Uneke, 2010, Belaye, 2009). When corruption becomes part of the *status quo*, its maintenance tends to involve the use of repressive tactics through the state instruments for law and order. Political leaders, in whose own self-interest it is to maintain the patrimonial state, will suppress political opposition and public criticism of their behavior. When political development and stability are undermined then the process of national development is also undermined. There can be no effective long-term planning under such circumstances and the construction of democracy and the democratic experience become threatened. In other words, things begin to fall apart. That is certainly the experience of Nigeria whose military governments had long since over-stayed their welcome and ruled only by brute force (Eddy and Akpan, 2008).

The final type of consequence stemming from corruption in Africa pertains to administrative development. Corruption hinders administrative development and performance in developing states partly because of its institutional spillover effects. It has been found that corrupt public officials export their corrupt activities to other institutions by extending influence and pressure on other public officials as a means of sustaining rent-seeking opportunities (Mbaku, 1992).

Indeed, the damaging effect of corruption on administrative development and efficiency can be very extensive and variegated. Once the corruption syndrome has afflicted a bureaucracy, the resulting negligence, protected through favoritism or other influences, creates innumerable problems and grave consequences for the people. Consequently, corruption may be seen from two perspectives: that inflicted on the people, and that practiced between corrupt public officials.

Moreover, such corrupt activities can move from a passive to an active phase where public servants do not wait to be approached and bribed but go out and actively solicit individuals to offer bribes in return for the provision of public services. In a country like Nigeria, such payments are regarded as necessary and routine but they do not guarantee that transactions will be expedited (Eddy and Akpan, 2008). However, if such payments are not made there will be absolutely no action taken

on the transactions. In other words, this type of corruption has become the unofficial but operating administrative order not only in Nigeria but also in most African countries.

Corruption also affects professionalism in the African public services and leads to frustration on the part of the few honest public servants to the extent that they emigrate. In Uganda, for example, these emigrants have mainly included medical doctors, teachers, engineers, economists and university lecturers from a wide variety of professional fields (Ouma, 1991). This, in turn, contributes to the brain drain dilemma of the African states and, thereby, further impairs national productivity, output and the overall development process.

GOOD GOVERNANCE AS AN ANTIDOTE TO CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

The fight against corruption should go hand-in-hand with more general efforts to improve economic governance. However, success in more general reform efforts should be seen as neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for eliminating corruption, nor should the difficulties to be overcome in implementing broad-based reforms be used as an excuse for delay in tackling corruption. Furthermore, even in an otherwise well ordered system of governance; corruption can thrive in the absence of effective vigilance and enforcement. Sustained action is required at two levels to address the root causes of corruption and tackle all its manifestations:

- Systemic reforms, which target the underlying weaknesses in policy, administration and politics, and create an environment conducive to the elimination of corruption;
- Specific, focused national anti-corruption strategies.

In mounting a serious national anti-corruption program, the first step of securing a strong commitment at the highest political level to fight corruption is often the most difficult hurdle. When corruption is widespread, particularly where it involves the political establishment, this may involve serious political risks, despite popular support for cleaner government. The solution may be an amnesty for corrupt acts committed in the past, combined with an explicit code of conduct, spelling out minimum standards of universal applicability, which will be enforced vigorously from the start of the new anti-corruption program.

POPULAR MOBILIZATION AGAINST CORRUPTION

The most potent force in the fight against corruption is the widespread resentment of corrupt practices and popular support for firm action. Anti-corruption programs need to be designed to meet the expectations of citizens and with public participation. They are likely to be more effective when they are built on the foundation of popular empowerment, nationally owned and designed to meet national circumstances.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of good governance extends beyond government. Although an anti-corruption strategy usually focuses initially on preventing the use of public office for private gain, support could be enhanced if the dangers of unethical practices in the private sector and non-governmental institutions are more widely appreciated. Corrupt behavior (e.g. by corporate purchasing agents, or in job recruitment) can be as destructive of the performance of businesses or of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as it is of government. Private corporations, NGOs and all other sectors of civil society have a stake in combating a

culture of corruption. Moreover, even where governments are less than enthusiastic in tackling corruption, popular support and the agencies of civil society can still be mobilized in support of an anticorruption agenda.

THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

There is a strong case on a number of grounds for international cooperation in fighting corruption:

- Countries embarking on an anti-corruption strategy can learn from the experience of those that have already had some success in reducing corruption; furthermore, international co-operation can reinforce national efforts to combat corruption;
- In a globalized economy, transactions across borders are of increasing importance, but are often difficult to monitor by national authorities acting alone;
- International transactions may sometimes provide a conducive environment for corrupt practices, where actors are willing to engage in dubious practices abroad that would be unacceptable at home;
- International financial transactions provide opportunities for the laundering of financial gains from corrupt practices.
- Given the global nature of corruption, there should be no double standards. Anti-corruption measures should apply equally to rich and poor countries. They should target those who are directly guilty of corrupt behavior, as well as those who facilitate corruption (e.g. by providing money laundering opportunities). They should penalize both bribers and bribes (i.e. those who offer, as well as those who accept bribes).

NATIONAL ACTIONS

Under the over-arching policy objective of "zero tolerance", specific measures are required to prevent corruption, enforce laws against it and mobilize public support. These should be the sinews of coherent national strategies to achieve good governance and combat corruption. A general approach to the formulation of such strategies is set out below, but specific programs reflecting national realities and circumstances will be required to translate such a general approach into practice. African government should, therefore, develop its own national good governance and anticorruption strategy, which should identify clear objectives, effective instruments, realistic timetables and credible implementation and monitoring mechanisms. National strategies should encompass both the public and private sectors. Corruption in the private sector (e.g. in the operation of financial markets) can be as corrosive to economic performance as public sector corruption. Moreover, public sector corruption typically involves actors from the private sector. A national culture opposed to corruption requires high standards of behavior from all sections of society, but especially from political leaders. Effective national campaigns against corruption need support from the highest levels of government and implementation of the strategy requires high-level coordination. Hence, an important first step in developing national strategies is for the political leadership to recognize that corruption in both the public and private sectors has heavy economic and political costs and that, no matter how deeply embedded it is, it is possible to adopt effective measures against it, provided there is sufficient political will.

In this regard, countries like Ethiopia and Cote d'Ivoire have established commissions, which have a mandate to curb the menace of corruption, protect national and foreign investments in the country, and identify illegally acquired wealth and confiscate it (Belaye, 2009, Rasheed 1995). The ombudsman system, designed to curb ethical violations, has been applied in

a number of African countries, including, Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Rasheed 1995, Belaye, 2009).

KEY REFORMS IN GOVERNANCE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

THE MAIN BUILDING BLOCKS

While the content of national strategies will vary, depending on national circumstances, there are three main building blocks for effective strategies: prevention, enforcement and the engagement of civil society. Prevention should address underlying causes of corruption, particularly those arising from failures of public policy and weaknesses in political and administrative institutions. Economic policy reform to reduce rent-seeking opportunities; civil service reform to improve the effectiveness and probity of the public service; reforms in tax policy and administration; tightening of controls over public expenditure; and reforms in the political system are all important ingredients of a prevention strategy. An important contribution to prevention can be made by strengthening transparency in economic management, through:

- Full disclosure and examination of government finances, especially by parliamentary scrutiny;
- Strengthening of parliamentary public accounts committee;
- The use of open competitive bidding for government contracts;
- Publication of full information on the reports of government auditors and evaluations of development projects;
- Media access to information on government finances;
- Full disclosure of assets by government leaders and their families;
- Setting international financial agreements before the legislature (including arms procurement) and establishing clear guidelines for fiscal discipline;
- Establishment of mechanisms for public exposure where the above do not occur;

Prevention should concentrate not only on the behavior of the holders of offices of trust, but also aim to affect the behavior of those who offer bribes. A code of practice for private business should spell out what is a corrupt practice, and what is legitimate business promotion. Acceptable practices in relation to business sponsorship of public activities (e.g. sports and social events) and to the employment of public officials as consultants or in other capacities, while in office and after retirement, need to be spelt out. As with all regulation, prevention is more likely if lawful behavior is widely accepted as the norm.

Enforcement involves firm action against corrupt behavior at all levels. Since effective enforcement is dependent upon the competence and honesty of investigators, prosecutors and the judiciary, it is important to allocate sufficient resources to ensure the probity and effectiveness of these agents. The rule of law should apply to economic transactions, with equality and impartiality in the application of the law and in access to legal remedies. Any ambiguities in laws and regulations that create incentives for corrupt behavior should be removed. Where the integrity of legal institutions has eroded, action to restore their credibility must come early in the implementation of a national anti-corruption strategy. Mobilization of popular support through the engagement of civil society and popular opinion is important in changing public mores, as well as in exerting pressure on governments (at both national and local levels) to take the necessary actions to prepare and implement anti

corruption programs. Perhaps the greatest potential force for reforms to combat corruption stems from public resentment of corruption and the burdens it places on citizens. This can provide an important basis of political support for anti-corruption actions, and challenge vested interests. Popular pressures can ensure accountability for the management of public resources, including accountability through the appropriate legislative bodies to the public and, where external resources are concerned, to the international community. Popular opinion can be activated and focused through the educational impact of the media and through the activities of NGOs, In particular:

- The freedom of the press and of other media contributes to public awareness of corruption and its consequences;
- The commitment of governments to freedom of expression and association is therefore a critical factor in creating conditions which are conducive for improving governance and eliminating corruption
- In situations where the media itself may be corrupt or susceptible to corruption, adherence to high standards of integrity in journalism should be promoted, along with the development of professional well-informed media, through self-regulation and training.

NGOs concerned with governance and corruption (e.g. Transparency International) should be encouraged in their efforts to create a presence and raise awareness at the national level. Governments should be encouraged to recognize and respect the positive contribution of national NGOs, which campaign on corruption issues.

Action against corruption should not await the implementation of other complex reforms. Parallel actions to improve economic management, administration and the political process could greatly improve the prospects of success in combating Corruption. Key reforms that would contribute to the fight against corruption include:

- Economic reforms which reduce rent-seeking opportunities. Reforms can reduce bureaucratic controls that allow undue scope for the exercise of administrative discretion, as well as simplify economic regulations. They can, also remove policy-induced scarcities (which create parallel markets and incentives to bribe to gain access to scarce goods and amenities). It is understood that these reforms in no way imply the endowment of the regulatory role of the state in conducting the ordinary business of government.
- Fiscal reforms, which increase the efficiency of the public sector, thus permitting adequate funding of public services. Privatization can have beneficial consequences but it should be principally driven by considerations of efficiency.
- Reform of subsidized public lending programs, which readily become vehicles for corruption. This may be achieved through better targeting as well as transparency in the operation of the programs, by changing and strengthening the criteria for entitlement and reducing reliance on political/administrative discretion in their operation. It is understood, of course, that public policy may dictate subsidized lending programs in particular circumstances without prejudice to the pursuit of sound fiscal policies.
- Reforms to improve the management, efficiency and delivery of public services. In view of the increasing trend towards contracting out and/or privatizing services previously provided by the state, measures to improve

management and efficiency should encompass all those who have responsibilities for providing goods and services in the public interest.

- Civil service reform, which restores the morale and integrity of the public service through merit-based recruitment and promotion, and reduces the size and tasks of public administration to levels consistent with available fiscal resources, thus making it easier to enhance emoluments and reward good performance.
- Legal reform, which commits sufficient resources to the judiciary, investigative and prosecution services, ensures the autonomy of the judiciary from political interference, and demands high standards of honesty and commitment in recompense.
- Local government reforms, for the purpose of empowering people to combat corruption; ownership of national action would not be complete without the empowerment of people and strengthening of civil society.
- Monitoring of privatization to ensure that the transfer of public assets does not create opportunities for the illicit accumulation of wealth.
- Opening up the administrative and political systems to greater public scrutiny through parliamentary enquiries and freedom of information provisions, with the aim of bringing public pressure to bear on political and economic decision-makers to maintain high standards in public service.
- Reforms in the funding of political parties; While rules on funding will vary depending upon national circumstances, in general, it is important that they should serve to prevent conflicts of interest and the exercise of improper influence, preserve the integrity of democratic political structures and processes, and enshrine the concept of transparency in the funding of political parties by requiring the declaration of donations exceeding a specified limit.
- Capacity building to enhance the capacity of core economic management institutions (e.g. ministries of finance, revenue collection agencies and auditor-generals' departments).

Some aspects of economic reform, while ultimately having the potential to reduce corruption, can create additional opportunities for misappropriation of public resources during the implementation phase. Thus, privatization programs, intended to reduce the scope for public sector rents, have themselves provided opportunities for corrupt public servants to transfer public assets illicitly. Fiscal stabilization, aimed at reducing disequilibrium in the economy, has often resulted in reductions of the real income of civil servants, consequently increasing pressures on them to seek illicit incomes. The introduction of multi-party politics, intended to promote pluralism and place governments under tighter public scrutiny, also increases the need for politicians to seek funds.

National anti-corruption strategies should define a longer-term program with some decisive short-term time-bound actions to ensure that there is credibility and continuity in the process of change. There is a need to move on a number of fronts simultaneously, but at varying speeds, as some reforms are easier to implement than others. In cases where corruption has fed on poor economic policies and fiscal imbalances, progress will be easier when certain basic economic reforms have been put in place, as a prelude to administrative reforms and the launching of an anti-corruption campaign. In other cases, political reform may have to be the first step in order to increase the likelihood of the political leadership finding the Political will to sustain a national strategy.

Although the speed with which a meaningful program can be formulated and implemented will vary, all governments should be encouraged to commit themselves to the policy objective of "zero tolerance" and to institute the first steps to formulate comprehensive' and realistic programs.

ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND LEGAL SYSTEM

The legal system is central to the effective implementation of a national anti-corruption strategy. The rule of law implies that, legally defined procedures govern public economic management, rather than political favoritism or personal connections. The independence and integrity of the judiciary is of vital importance. Most African countries formally guarantee the independence of the judiciary from political control, but a key factor is the integrity of the members of the judiciary. Where the judiciary is corrupt, a crucial first step in a national strategy is reform which restores its integrity and efficiency. This may require restructuring, training and committing sufficient funds to compensate members of the judiciary adequately and to provide them with the means of operating effectively. Similarly, the quality and integrity of those public agencies responsible for investigating corruption and prosecuting offenders need to be ensured. Public prosecution should be supplemented by broadening access to the courts, with individuals and community groups being given the right to take legal action in the public interest.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

In many instances, especially where corruption transcends national boundaries, national anti-corruption measures need to be reinforced with support at an international level. This includes co-operative law enforcement initiatives against corruption, e.g. in the area of money laundering. There is a need for greater consultation on the international aspect of corruption on a genuinely multilateral basis, involving developed and developing countries, and a careful assessment of the degree to which international anti-corruption conventions designed to meet the needs of developed economies, also correspond to the requirements of developing economies. Most developing countries are not parties to the existing conventions. All developing countries should be able to participate effectively in the international campaign against corruption. This is particularly important in view of the increasing proportion of procurement under multilateral assistance sourced in developing countries, and the growing volumes of South-South trade and investment.

CONCLUSION

Corruption has had detrimental effects on Africa's economic, political, and social development. In the absence of democratic institutional arrangements that make the engagement in corrupt practices difficult, prevent systemic corruption-funded patronage, as well as limit state intervention in private exchange, the political leadership was inclined to over-regulate economic activity. It also created bloated, expensive, corrupt, and inefficient bureaucracies, which have been a major constraint on sustainable growth and development.

Thus, the most effective approach to deal with corruption in Africa is for each state to make, and effectively enforce, constitutional provisions for accountability of public officials, and guarantee participatory democracy, which encourages

popular participation of civil society to ensure accountability and transparency of governance. Good governance is not a luxury but a basic requirement for development in Africa. Corruption, which undermines development, is generally an outcome and a symptom of poor governance. It has reached global proportions and needs to be tackled directly and explicitly. African countries should firmly commit themselves to the policy of “zero tolerance” of all types of corruption. This policy must permeate national political cultures, governance, legal systems and administration. Where corruption is ingrained and pervasive, especially at the highest political levels, its eradication may require more sustained effort over a protracted period of time.

REFERENCES

- Adedeji, A. (1995). *The Economics of Bribery and Corruption, Seminar Outline Faculty of the Social Sciences*, University of Ibadan.
- Africa Confidential (1997) September 26, Vol. 38. 19
- Ajayi, Ibi S. (1997) An Analysis of External Debt and Capital Flight in the Severely Indebted Low Income Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, *IMF, Working Paper WP/97/68*.
- Ayittey, G. B. N. (1992). *Africa Betrayed*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Belaye, G. (2009). Combating Corruption in Ethiopia: Opportunities and Challenges of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission., in Samson K. and Tilaye K. (eds). *A Journey towards Sustainable Development: Approaches, Challenges and Prospects*, HY International, Addis Ababa.
- Caiden, G.E., Dwivedi, O.P., and Jabbra, J., (2002). *Where Corruption Lives*, Bloomfield, CT; Kumarian Press.
- David J.C. (1980). *Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire*. New York: Pergamon.
- Demeke Getachew (2000) Developments in Good Governance since the World Summit for Social Development: the Western and Central Africa Experience, *African Journal of Public Administration and Management Vol. XII: 2:71-81*.
- Edikan Nnabuk Eddy and Emem Etok Akpan (2008) Nigerian Government, the Public Sector and the Fight Against Corruption: The Role of Information and Communication Technology. *International NGO Journal Vol. 3 (10), pp. 162-166, October, 2008*
- Elliot, Michael. 1994. Corruption: The Global Threat to Growth. *Newsweek*, 14 November CXXIV(20):40-43.
- Frisch, D. (1995). Effects of Corruption on Development, in A. Aderinwale (ed.), *Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in Southern Africa*. Abeokuta, Nigeria: ALF Publications, 109- 115.
- Hope, Sr., K. R. (2000). *Corruption and Development in Africa*, in K. R. Hope, Sr. and B. C. Chikulo (ed.), *Corruption and Development in Africa*. New York: St Martin’s Press.
- Kaufmann, D., (2005). Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge, Chapter 15, in P.Alston (ed.), *Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.352-402.
- Mbaku, J. M. (1992). Bureaucratic Corruption as Rent-Seeking Behavior. *Konjunkturpolitik*, 38, No. 4: 247-265.

- Mbaku, J. M. (1998). Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Africa, in J. M. Mbaku (ed.). *Corruption and the Crisis of Institutional Reforms in Africa*, African Studies Volume 47. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Mojtabal, F. (2006), Corruption Rules Over Africa. *Socyberty* (October 11).
- Okafor, C. (2004). *Neo-Democracy and Poverty Management in Africa*. Mercury Bright Press: Awka, Nigeria.
- Otite O. (1986). *Presidential Address on the Sociological Study of Corruption in Nigeria: Corruption in Development* University Press, Ibadan.
- Ouma, S.O.A. (1991). Corruption in Public Policy and Its Impact on Development: The Case of Uganda since 1997, *Public Administration and Development*, Vol.11. No. 5 Pp. 472-490
- Oyebode, A. (1999). An Overview of Corruption in Nigeria A Paper Presented at the Roundtable on the Impact of Corruption on the Political Reform and Economic Recovery of Nigeria, *Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies*, March 30 – 31.
- Rasheed, S. (1995). Promoting Ethics and Accountability in African Public Services, in Sadig Rasheed & Luke, David F., (eds) *Development Management in Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995.
- Robert I. Rotberg (2007). *African's Successes Evaluating Accomplishment*, World Peace Foundation Report No. 43
- Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist,(2009). *Index of African Governance Data Set*, downloaded from /data/iag.html [March 19, 2011].
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruzindana B. (1998). *Corruption and National Development*, McGraw Hill, New York.
- Sandbrook, R. (1985). *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tanzi, V. (1995). Corruption, Government Activities and Markets, *Finance and Development*. Vol. 32 No. December: 24 – 26
- The Guardian (1999). Institutionalization of Corruption. *The Guardian Newspaper (Editorial, August 29)*. Lagos: Nigeria.
- Time (1992). Africa - A Vast Continent in Free Fall. (Cover Story: The Agony of Africa, September 7). *New York: Time Magazine*.
- Transparency International(2009). *The Global Coalition against Corruption* . TI 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin: Germany.
- Transparency International(2006) *The Global Coalition against Corruption*. TI 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin: Germany.
- UNDP (1997). *Governance for sustainable development*, UNDP, New York.
- UNECA (2006). *Economic Report on Africa 2006: Capital Flows and Development Financing in Africa*, Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Uneke, Okori (2010). Corruption in Africa South of Sahara: Bureaucratic Facilitator of Handicap to Development? *The Journal of Pan African studies*, Vol.3.No.6 : Pp11-128

World Bank (1993). *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

World Bank (1997) *World Development Report, The State in a Changing World*, Washington D.C. World Bank

World Bank (1998) *Assessing aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why*, Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press, Washington, DC.

Wuyts M, Mackintosh M and Hewitt T. (1992). *Development Policy and Public Action*. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Samson Kassahun is Associate Professor and Academic Vice President of Ethiopian Civil Service University.