Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 15, No.2, 2013)
ISSN: 1520-5509
Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, Pennsylvania

THE NEW DEVELOPMENT GULF: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEW FACE OF AFRICAN DEPENDENCY

Agaptus Nwozor

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu Aran, Kwara State, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

Global warming, which induces climate change, has monumentally altered nature's in-built stabilising mechanisms. The rich biodiversity which is vital to earth's stability is so overwhelmed that its rate of replenishment is grossly slower than its depletion. Although the ravaging effects of climate change are global, their worst manifestations appear to be in Africa. The sundry effects of climate change such as droughts, floods, rise in sea level, ocean acidification and other environmental problems are at the epicentre of Africa's current development challenges. Africa's dilemma is complicated by the seeming indifference of developed countries whose anthropogenic activities massively contributed in engendering climate change. This indifference manifests in lack of exemplary commitment of the developed countries to the various outcomes of negotiations in tackling the fallouts of climate change; ambivalence in their promises of increased aid since the Gleneagles' G8 Summit and the floating of climate loans fund under the watch of the World Bank as a strategy to finance climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes. This paper uses secondary data to analyse the trend of climate change and its effects on the African economies. The paper examines the changes across Africa such as poverty and hunger occasioned by food crises, conflicts arising from struggle for dwindling opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and other uncertainties and argues that climate change is deepening the development gulf. The paper finds a disconnect between the expectations of the climate loan fund and its capacity to tackle the climate change challenge in view of the conditionalities attached to the loans and concludes that the loans are not only retardant but effective mechanisms to create unsustainability in African economies and thus circumscribe and mortgage their development.

Keywords: Climate Change, Climate Justice, Sustainability, Climate Loan, Dependency, Development.

INTRODUCTION

Even though the anthropogenic activities of the developed countries engendered and fanned the embers of climate change, its effects and destructiveness are not localised to their environments alone. Climate change is a destroyer without borders as its effects reach the outermost parts of the globe. Its negative effects on earth's biodiversity have been so enormous: it has literally turned the world upside down, threatening to sink it like during the five episodic past when catastrophic physical disasters such as meteorite impacts created climate change that destroyed and disrupted ecosystems around the globe (Eldredge 2008).

And, because the impacts of climate change are beyond national borders, fixing its fallouts requires widespread collaboration and partnerships. As Zoellick (2010, xiii) observes, "no country alone can take on the interconnected challenges posed by climate change including controversial political decisions, daunting technological change and far-reaching global consequences". One of the major requirements for widespread collaboration is to stop the continued flowering of the practices that created climate change. So far, the targets set by previous Conferences of the Parties (COP) to reduce the emission levels of the detrimental greenhouse gases (GHGs), responsible for climate change and global warming, have been met in the breach.

Despite the international climate regime evolved in the past two decades especially the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2007 Bali Action Plan, no serious progress has been made in curbing the rampaging effects of climate change. This is principally so because the industrialised countries have only paid lip service to their implementation. Aside from encouraging poor countries to prepare National Adaptation Programmes of Action, they have done nothing else in the area of substantially curbing their emission levels, mobilising significant funding for technology transfer and deployment needed for low-carbon development and support for adaptation efforts (World Bank 2010, 233). Currently, the potential adaptation finance available is less than US$1 billion a year, as against funding requirements of US$30 to US$100 billion a year over the medium term. The developed countries have evolved strategies under the watch of the World Bank to entrap the developing countries with climate loans. What this means is that instead of deploying funds directly to address the various manifestations of the devastations wreaked by climate change, the developed countries envisage to advance such loans to African countries with typical Bretton Woods conditionalities.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Climate Change

Climate change denotes a serious and consistent deviation from the regular patterns of weather conditions. It is not merely the deviation from the "standard" climactic conditions that has made the phenomenon dangerous to the environment but its overall multiplier impacts over time. Climate change has come to depict specific abnormalities outside the precincts of ordinary change in climate. Ordinarily, there are largely unnoticed cyclical changes in the weather from day to day; and in the climate, from year to year. These obviously normal variations mean that the climate is not static but constantly changing.

Thus, the initial fugue and conceptual confusion surrounding climate change which originated from the normal variability of weather conditions was cleared by certain beacons set by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In Article 1 section 2, climate change was denoted as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods" (UNFCCC 1992).

An important distinction in the definition of climate change is the recognition of the contributions of natural and man-made influences in engendering it. Far more than natural causes, in the form of volcanic eruptions and astronomical fallouts, human socio-economic activities drive climate change (Anyadike 2009, 17). The manifestations of climate change are varied and seem to cover the entire field of the environment. Thus, changes in: average climactic condition, climactic variability, the frequency and magnitude of extreme weather events, sea levels; and increases in maximum temperature are within the purview of climate change. This led the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to define climate change as "statistically significant variations in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer)" (IPCC 2001, 788). The consequences of this variability are "shifts in the frequency and magnitude of sporadic weather events as well as the slow continuous rise in global mean surface temperature (Eboh, 2009, 11).

The greatest contributors to climate change are the various human socio-economic activities whose watershed was the industrial revolution that began in the late 18^{th} century. Despite the strides made since then, in terms of improved efficiency in the exploration and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources, as well as industrial activities, the march of civilisation is not without its stylised consequences. The trend of industrialisation and its dependence on fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas to power our civilisation has significantly driven climate change. These fuels, which had been used consistently and in geometrically expanding quantities since the late 18^{th} century, released greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere that cumulatively eroded the eco-balance. The Kyoto Protocol lists six major GHGs whose emissions have been implicated as constituting the large chunk of overall GHG emissions from human socio-economic activities. These include: carbon dioxide (CO_2), methane (CH_4), nitrous oxide (N_2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF_6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons.

By absorbing terrestrial radiation from the earth and re-radiating the heat back to earth, these GHGs lead to a general increase in temperature thus causing global warming. The earth is imbued with natural temperature control system. Certain atmospheric gases known as GHGs are critical to this system. Each day, the sun radiates rays of light onto the earth's surface. On the average, about a third of the solar radiation that hits the earth is reflected back to space. Of the remainder, the atmosphere absorbs some but the land and oceans absorb most. The earth's surface becomes warm and as a result emits infrared radiation. The GHGs trap the infrared radiation, thus warming the atmosphere. The problem we are facing today, which reflects in global warming is that human socio-economic activities increase the concentration and levels of GHGs in the atmosphere (IPCC 2001, 24; Ozor 2009, 27). Global greenhouse gas emissions from human activities have expectedly grown in magnitude since pre-industrial times with an increase of 70 percent between 1970 and 2004. Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO_2), methane (CH_4), and nitrous oxide (N_2O) have risen markedly since 1750 owing to

increased productive activities. For instance, the concentration of CO_2 in the atmosphere prior to 1750 was about 280 parts per million (ppm) but rose to 368 ppm in 2000 and by 2005, it had reached 379 ppm and is still on the rise. Since the introduction of continuous atmospheric measurement in the 1950s, CO_2 emissions were larger from 1995-2005. (UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2009, 18-21). The obvious manifestation of the effect of global warming is reflected in such checklists as higher average surface and ocean temperatures, more rapid evaporation and rainfall, more variability and severity in floods and droughts, rising sea levels, an increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.

Dependency

By dependency we mean the increasing inability of African economies to chart an independent course of survival and development. On account of Africa's low-level of industrialisation, its contributions to climate change are insignificant. Contrariwise, the industrialised world, since the epoch of industrial revolution has, wittingly and unwittingly, contributed and exacerbated the greenhouse effects that have led to climate change. But the effect of climate change is not restricted to the industrialised world but extends to the "ends" of the earth. Put differently, climate change has become a global phenomenon with huge implications for people, their survival, and their environments. The challenge of climate change is a multi-variegated challenge: at the epicentre is the question of survival; second is environmental sustainability, and third is development. Eboh (2009, 12) captures it thus, "countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, ...are likely to suffer the most because of their geographical locations, low incomes, and low institutional capacity, as well as their greater reliance on climate-sensitive renewable resources sectors like agriculture". Given the projections that global average surface temperature will continue to increase within the range of 1.4 – 5.8^{o}C by 2100 in comparison to 1990, Africa must gird its loins for climate change challenge.

The phenomenon of climate change is more like an octopus with its tentacles clawed into every area of development through the environment. The environmental consequences of climate change such as flooding, drought, desertification, soil degradation, erratic rainfall patterns, heat stress, disease and pest outbreaks on crops and livestock impact negatively on livelihoods, socio-economic orders, peace and conflicts, political stability and sustainability of economies. The overall danger of climate change occasioned by global warming is not just the distortion and erosion of the integrity of the environment but the unpredictability of its capacity to continue to support life in the long-run. But the predicament of Africa appears to be that it lacks the survivalist capacity even in the short-run. Africa is particularly disadvantaged in the race against climate change on account of its low-income status, sub-optimal scientific capacity to mitigate its impact as well as its overdependence on the environment for its economic survival. Climate change has already caused serious widespread upheavals in Africa, distorting its traditional life pattern, creating new challenges and threatening state survival.

Sustainable Development

The major concern with climate change in Africa is the issue of sustainable development. But the concept of sustainable development is highly contested. The contestation is a product of its trans-disciplinary attributes and applicability. But despite the theoretical cobwebs that obfuscate the concept, there appears to be convergence among scholars about what should constitute sustainability (Munasinghe 2003, 44). The Brundtland Commission outlined the basic components of sustainable development as meeting current needs while maintaining capacity to meet future needs (WCED 1987). The diversity of the

concept of sustainable development and its applicability across several fields has led to the recognition of four domains of its operationalisation, namely ecological, political, socio-cultural and economic domains.(Beg et al 2002: 131; Wikipedia, nd) Within these domains the important factor is that sustainability is synonymous with engendering limitations and working out compromises, which ensure that current satisfaction of present needs does not jeopardise opportunities for meeting future needs.

The negativities of climate change conflict with the tenets of sustainability. As Munasinghe (2003, 44) succinctly puts it, "climate change and sustainable
development interact in a circular fashion.
" What this implies is that the manifold effects of climate change circumscribe the potentialities of not only meeting present needs but also undermine the possibilities of sustaining the environment to meet future needs.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT GULF

The cost of climate change to Africa is enormous: it spans economic, political, social, cultural and military spheres amongst others. Climate change has seriously deepened its vulnerabilities, reversed and eroded its hard-won gains in economic, social, and political sectors, and adversely undermined its prospects for development (Zoellick 2010, xiii). The destruction of Africa's rich biodiversity means that its quest for development is greatly imperilled. This is so because the bulk of Africa's foreign exchange is earned from agricultural, biological and mineral resources. Currently, Africa's share of the world trade is increasingly dwindling. Since the World War II, world trade has expanded dramatically from US$ 80 billion in 1953 to more than US$ 8 trillion in 2004. But Africa's share of the world trade does not reflect the monumental global expansion. In fact, Africa's share of the world trade has steadily declined as its major export commodities like coffee, copper and diamonds have fallen in value relative to manufactured exports. Africa's share in world merchandise exports fell from 6.3 percent in 1980 to 2.5 percent in 2000. While Asia's share of manufactured exports expanded reaching 27.8 percent in 2006, Africa's share in world manufactured exports has remained unchanged at 0.8 percent in two decades (BBC, 2007; ECIPE, 2007; Ministerial Statement 2004). In the same vein, Sub-Saharan Africa's share spiralled down from 6 percent in 1980 to 3.5 percent in 2008. Gross domestic savings in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) fell from 25 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 19.3 per cent in 2009. Throughout Africa, government revenue considerably contracted in 2009. In SSA as a whole, government revenue excluding grants declined from 25.1 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 21 per cent in 2009 (UNECA 2010, 81,95). Kabbaj (2004) has attributed the deterioration in Africa's global market share to two factors: one, the failure to maintain traditional comparative advantage in primary commodities, and two, limited success in diversifying exports into manufactures, which command a larger and increasing share of world trade.

The mainstream position of analysts that market practices such as market access, non-tariff barriers, tariff escalation, and agricultural subsidies by the industrialised countries are implicated in Africa's retracting global trade shares are flawed in the wake of climate change distortions. African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in their 37th session in Kampala in 2004 squarely underpinned Africa's dwindling world trade share on market-distorting subsidies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) partners and high tariffs on strategic agricultural products (Ministerial Statement 2004). The emerging trade truth, as demonstrated by the US Africa Growth and Opportunity

Act (AGOA) and the Everything but Arms Initiative of the European Union (EU), is that substantial reduction or dismantling of the protectionist walls of the developed countries cannot automatically translate to, or facilitate, export expansion in the absence of goods to export. As Tesfamariam (2009) argues,

> Almost 10 years since the introduction of AGOA by the Clinton Administration, oil imports to the US from Nigeria, Angola and Gabon still make up over 94% of Africa´s export to the US under AGOA. So who benefited? …The much touted "success" in the textile sectors were a gross exaggeration and in some cases actually reversed development of these sectors… .

Africa's productive capacity is seriously impaired by the effects of climate change. Apart from the destruction of its biodiversity and the unquantifiable overall effects, there is a prevalence of extremities in Africa's continuum of weather conditions which oscillate between droughts and floods. These two extreme weather conditions are not only antithetical to agricultural productivity but also put pressures on government finances for mitigation and remediation. The causes of climate change are external to Africa but its impacts live with and dictate the trajectory of its development, which is down the hill of development. Presently, the expectations of growth and development that were generated at the beginning of the present millennium through the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have all dissipated in the face of mounting challenges orchestrated by climate change. For instance, although Sub-Saharan Africa produces a mere 4 percent of the world's GHGs, the region's diverse climates and ecological systems have been seriously altered by global warming and are predicted to undergo further damage in years ahead (Fleshman 2007, 14). What this suggests is that development dilemma in this region, as well as the whole of Africa, will deepen in the years ahead in the face of drying rivers and dams, shrinking lakes, disappearing forests and wetlands and loss of fertility of agricultural lands. The prospects of drying rivers, dams and lakes particularly add a new twist in the continent's development matrix. Most countries of Africa depend on hydro-power for their electricity needs. The fall in the levels of rivers, dams and lakes means proportional reduction in power generating capacity (Nawangwe 2010). The direct effect of this is four-fold: one, scarce resources will be deployed to purchasing alternative sources of power generation for home and industrial use; two, the likely alternative source of power generation is thermal generators with possibilities of escalation in electricity tariffs; third, with higher electricity tariffs, either from public or private sources, cost of production is pushed upwards undermining the competitiveness of African goods in the global arena and four, poverty depth and levels are likely to be exacerbated following contractions in the economies.

Associated with climate change is the natural disaster-induced humanitarian crisis it has spawned all over the world especially Africa. Some 262 million people were affected by climate disasters annually from 2000 to 2004 with over 98 percent of them in the developing world (UNDP 2007, 2). Vast populations are displaced from their traditional abodes. Climate change has replaced armed conflicts as the driver of internal displacement. An important limitation in the analysis of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is the seemingly exclusive and stereotyped linkage of internal displacement to armed conflicts and violence. For instance, in 2009, while there were no new conflicts around the world and equally little evidence suggesting expansion in the scope of conflicts, the IDMC linked the causative factors of new displacements totalling 6.8 million people to their schema of conflict (IDMC 2009, 1). Indeed, most armed conflicts in Africa are intrinsically linked to resources, either for the purpose of gaining access, controlling and exploiting them or on the other

hand dispelling rogue groups. Glossing over or isolating armed conflicts from their core causative factors and treating them autonomously renders analyses unhelpful and unproductive.

In 2009, IDMC's monitoring of 21 African countries yielded a figure of 11.6 million internally displaced persons (IDP), some more than 40 percent of global IDP population. Interestingly, there appears a correlation between the countries with the most population of IDP and those seriously affected by climate change like countries of Eastern Africa and the Great Lakes region that were ravaged by drought (Nawangwe 2010; Ford 2011, 2-3). Displacements whether by conflicts or climate change-induced natural disasters, create tensions that undermine development. Added to this checklist is the distinct possibility of political instability associated with feelings of deprivation and low esteem as a result of loss of means of livelihoods. Whatever development projections made by Africa without workable solution about how to rein in the monster of climate change is likely to be utopian.

THE TRAJECTORIES: CLIMATE CHANGE AND NEO-DEPENDENCY

Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, there has evolved what could be called international climate regime. The major pillars of this climate regime are the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2007 Bali Action Plan. Despite the fact that the various components of the international climate regime are targeted at stabilising atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at safe levels that would not interfere with the climate system as well as set emission targets, no meaningful progress has been made in the management of global climate. In fact emissions have increased by 25 percent since the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, adopted and brought into force (World Bank 2010, 233). What this suggests is that the industrialised countries, which are culpable in the climate change saga, are not persuaded by its adverse effects on the development projections of Africa and the developing world.

The peculiarity of Africa's development dilemma is that climate change was not factored into the various bilateral, multilateral, regional and continent-wide protocols of cooperation toward development. Thus, such key African Union (AU) declarations, like the 2003 Common Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework which targeted 6 percent annual agricultural growth, and the counterpart 2003 Maputo Declaration which committed African leaders to 10 percent public expenditure on agriculture, the 2004 Sirte Declaration on Agriculture and Water which reiterated commitment to agricultural production, the 2006 Abuja Fertiliser Summit and the 2006 Abuja Food Security Summit which adopted resolutions towards the raising of fertiliser use from 8 to 50 kilogrammes per hectare and the renewal of commitment to earlier declarations and their international variants, like the G8-professed support for African agriculture, EU/AU Cooperation Strategy on Agricultural Development, the 2005 Hong Kong Declaration aimed at reducing trade distorting subsidies to agricultural products, the 2002 World Food Summits and the 2008 Conference on World Food Security, have not translated into any significant improvements in agricultural productivity in Africa. The resultant effects have been reduction in Africa's agricultural exports and share of global trade, food scarcity and unmanageable rise in the prices of foodstuff. Even with the estimated US$20 billion spent annually on food importation by Africa, almost 200 million Africans as at 2000 were undernourished. (Udo 2010; InterAcademy 2004, 9). The near permanence of the effect of climate change means that current food shortages and hunger associated with it are not by any means transient. This is so because the specific shocks of droughts and floods that engender it have come to dictate the trajectory of agricultural production. According to the 2010

Global Hunger Index, out of 29 countries categorised as having alarming or extremely alarming levels of hunger, 22 of them were African countries most of whose conditions had deteriorated from their 1990 levels (IFPRI, 2010).

The trend in environmental disasters caused by climate change suggests that one of the cardinal goals of the MDGs, eradicating extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, is unrealisable. And, because other MDGs are, more or less intricately interlinked with it, their realisation poses a major challenge. The centrality of poverty in the matrix of development is underscored by its relevance in the determination of the direction of other key indicators of development. Such key indicators of development as population, gross national product, gross domestic product, life expectancy are dependent on, and are calculable and measurable according to the impact of poverty on them.

The disconnect between promises and action in the negotiations between the industrialised countries, whose activities created climate change, and the developing countries, who bear its brunt and suffocate under its weight, lies in the underlying economics of climate change. Taking drastic action will hurt the system of production of the developed countries, rearrange power equations amongst them on account of adaptation to changing production patterns and involve huge financial outlays for mitigation and adaptation programmes. It is estimated by the World Bank (2010, 257) that developing countries would require between US$140 to US$175 billion a year over the next 20 years for mitigation and US$30 to US$100 billion a year over the period 2010-2050 for adaptation investments. But current levels of US$10 billion a year falls short of estimated needs.

The imperative of evolving an integrated adaptive mechanism is denoted by the urgent need to put development on course in Africa. But, adaptive mechanisms do not come easy as they entail the mobilisation of resources (both human and material), which facilitate the use of new scientific information and technical knowledge to improve understanding, inform future decisions, monitor the outcome of interventions, and develop new practices (World Bank 2010, 90). These processes are not supposed to be country-specific but global. Unfortunately, the industrialised countries have done practically little to curb emission, mobilise funds and technology and spearhead adaptation techniques (World Bank 2010, 233).

ENTER THE NOOSE: CLIMATE LOAN AND THE RETREAT OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

A major sore area in the climate change debate especially in evolving effective mitigation and adaptation strategies is financing. There is a serious financial constraint in mobilising resources to pursue adaptation and mitigation programmes against the effects of climate change. The potential adaptation finance now available is less than $1 billion a year, against funding requirements of US$ 30 to US$ $100 billion a year over the medium term (World Bank 2010, 263). Unsettled questions in this area are: “how much financing will be available, its sources, how its expenditure will be controlled, and on what basis it will be monitored” (World Bank 2010, 239). While there is a broad agreement that developed countries will transfer funds to assist in addressing climate change-induced environmental challenges, there is uncertainty in the aspects of intervention, mainly as a result of the dichotomisation of climate-related funding into adaptation and mitigation. There is a mindset that every party - both developed and developing countries – should have a responsibility in the solution to climate change. This mindset underpins the idea of climate funds. While the developed countries canvass aid and the mechanism of conditionality in funding mitigation and adaptation programmes, the developing countries reject it, insisting that fund usage should be guided by recipient-country's priorities. Secondly, many high-income countries see public funds as playing a lim-

ited role in supporting climate financing in the developing world. What this means is that a greater proportion of funds will be harnessed through market mechanisms. (World Bank, 2010).

The implication of introducing the concept of market mechanism in the deployment of climate loans is that decisions about which countries to advance loans and the conditions to be attached to them are to be determined by market forces. Thus, market mechanism is a surreptitious ploy to suck African economies into the vortex of sovereign debt. Not only will the negativities of climate change checkmate possibilities of redeeming these debts, African economies would, most likely, be sucked into the inner recesses of the periphery of the world economy. The climate loan proposal depicts a new chapter in the march of capital and entrenchment of underdevelopment. It depicts a new era of neo-peripheralisation: the erosion of the sovereign independence of African states.

The climate loan organised by the World Bank, which is called Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) is a loan model set up to advance loans to developing countries to cushion the fallouts of climate change. It is part of the Climate Investment Funds run by the World Bank together with other regional multilateral development banks. According to Bretton Woods Project (2012, 3), the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) are financing instruments designed to pilot low-carbon and climate-resilient development through the multilateral development banks (MDBs). CIFs comprise of two trust funds – the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The SCF which is designed to pilot new development approaches consists of three targeted programmes: Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR), Forest Investment Program (FIP) and Scaling up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP).

The PPCR has been likened to a man opting to lend his victim money to fix a damage he had caused (Worthy et al, 2011). Climate loan is incongruent with justice; indeed, it is climate injustice. There are moral, policy and strategic implications with the PPRC climate loan. Worthy et al (2011) inform that "the idea of climate loans was created by the UK Labour government as an accountancy trick to make its balance sheet look better, a policy continued by the current coalition government". Why would Africa and other developing countries bear the brunt of climate change which they did not cause? The paradox of the whole issue is that the funds from the CIFs end up in the pockets of big corporations. Commenting on United Kingdom's pledge of nearly £2 billion over the next two years in the latest climate change talks in Doha, Alex Scrivener, the World Development Movement's policy officer asserted,

> The UK government is trying to present itself as being progressive on climate change by making this announcement at Doha. But this conceals a pro-corporate agenda which risks channelling money meant for the poor to benefit big business. The UK's obsession with bringing in big business at all costs risks leaving projects that help poor people adapt to the effects of climate change without funds. These projects are often not profitable and are therefore not attractive to private sector investors. It is these vital adaptation projects that should be made a priority for support with UK public money (cited in Gray 2012).

The cost of climate change is as equally crippling to the developed countries as it is to the developing countries. As the World Bank (2010, 102) informs, "Hurricane Katrina in 2005 bankrupted the U.S. flood insurance program 10 times over, with more claims in one year than in its 37-year history. And few government-sponsored crop insurance programs are financially

sustainable without major subsidies". Also, between 1999 and 2004, insured losses from climate events averaged US$17 billion a year translating into a five-fold increase (in 2004 terms) over the four years to 1990 (UNDP, 2007). The present burden of climate change and the projections of increased variability in the climactic conditions indicate that Africa can never develop the capacity to repay the loan. And the implication is debt trap that mortgage its socio-economic and political independence.

CONCLUSION

There is no country that is enamoured of the destructive effects of climate change. The various scientific projections about the effects of climate change are not cheery. The most potent strategies to surmount the challenges of climate change are embedded in collaboration, which start with the principles of "let the polluter pay according to the magnitude of their pollution". Even though not much has been achieved in terms of meeting the benchmarks set by various conferences of the parties (COPs), the individualisation of solutions to climate change will put countries at cross purposes that might trigger conflicts. Delinking from the global efforts against the challenge of climate change is not an option to be considered by Africa. Africa's development challenges and acute vulnerability to climate change, which have reversed all its indices of growth and development, put it a good stead to rally global collaboration.

The implication of the effects of climate change is that sustainable development has been sacrificed. What sustainability stands for is continuity. Climate change is anti-sustainability as its effects deny and preclude future generations from the enjoyment of the environments. What needs to be done is to hold countries accountable for non-adherence to both adaptation and mitigation programmes. Climate loans are out of the question for Africa as its present vulnerability occasioned by climate change will deepen its woes and entrap them.

REFERENCES

Anyadike, R. N. C. (2009) Climate change and sustainable development in Nigeria: conceptual and empirical issues. In *Implications of climate change for economic growth and sustainable development in Nigeria. Enugu Forum policy paper no. 10*. Enugu: African Institute for Applied Economics.

Beg, Noreen; Morlot, Jan Corfee; Davidson, Ogunlade; Afrane-Okesse, Yaw;
Tyani, Lwazikazi; Denton, Fatma; Sokona, Youba; Thomas, Jean Philippe; La Rovere, Emilio Lèbre; Parikh, Jyoti K; Parikh, Kirit & Rahman, A. Atiq (2002). Linkages between climate change and sustainable development
. *Climate Policy,* 2, 129–144.

Bretton Woods Project (2012). Climate Investment Funds Monitor 6. Retrieved from http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/env/CIFMonitor6.pdf. Accessed on 28 November 2012.
Eboh, Eric (2009). Introduction. In *Implications of climate change for economic growth and sustainable development in Nigeria. Enugu Forum policy paper no. 10*. Enugu: African Institute for Applied Economics.

ECIPE (European Centre for International Political Economy) (2007). Africa and the world. Media briefing note 1/2007. Retrieved from: http://www.ecipe.org/press/Briefing %20note%20-%20Africa%20and%20world%20trade.pdf. Accessed on 20 August 2011.

Eldredge, Niles (2008) Biodiversity. *Microsoft Encarta 2009 [DVD]*. Redmond, W.A: Microsoft Corporation.

Fleshman, Michael (2007). Climate change: Africa gets ready. *Africa Renewal,*. vol. 21, no.2 (July). Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-2007/climate-change-africa-gets-ready. Accessed on 19 August 2011

Global Hunger Index 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ ghi10 factsfinding.pdf. Accessed on 20 August 2011.

Gray, Louise (2012). Climate change funds earmarked for Africa 'are going to corporations'. *The Telegraph* (UK). Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/ 9723731/Climate-change-funds-earmarked-for-Africa-are-going-to-corporations.html. Accessed 10 December 2012

IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) (2009). Internal displacement in Africa. Retrieved from: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1%28httpinfoFiles %29/82288114CF5303AAC12577250061AC31/$File/G02009_Africa.pdf. Accessed 12 august 2010.

IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute) (2010). The Challenge of hunger: focus on the crisis of child under nutrition. Retrieved from: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/ publications/ghi10.pdf. Accessed 22 August 2011

InterAcademy Council (2004). *Realizing the promise and potential of African agriculture.* Amsterdam: InterAcademy Council.

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2001). *Climate change 2001: the scientific basis.* Houghton, J. T., Ding, Y., Griggs, D.J., Noguer, M., van der Linden, P.J., Dai, X., Maskell, K. and Johnson, C.A. (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kabbaj, Omar (2004). Trade, development and poverty reduction in Africa. *Remarks at the 2004 ECA Ministerial Conference on mainstreaming trade policy in national development strategies*, Kampala, Uganda. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/00158624-EN-PDT-SPEECH-ECA-MINISTERIAL-CONF-22MAY2004E.PDF. Accessed on 22 August 2011.

Ministerial statement of the thirty-seventh session of the commission/conference of African ministers of finance, planning and economic development held between 21 and 22 May, 2004 in Kampala, Uganda. Retrieved from: http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2004/ministerial_statement.htm. Accessed on 20 August 2011.

Munasinghe, Mohan (2003). Climate change and sustainable development linkages: Points of departure from the IPCC tar. In Munasinghe, Mohan; Canziani, Osvaldo; Davidson, Ogunlade; Metz, Bert; Parry, Martin & Harrison, Mike (eds). *Integrating Sustainable Development and Climate Change in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report*. Colombo: Munasinghe Institute for Development (MIND)/Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Nawangwe, Barnabas (2010). Climate change threatens Africa's competitiveness. Retrieved from: http://www.tci-network.org/news/card/20. Accessed on 20 August 2011.

Oxfam (2011). East Africa food crisis: poor rains, poor response. *Oxfam Briefing Note*. Retrieved from: http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-east-africa-food-crisis-200711-en.pdf. Accessed on 20 August 2011.

Tesfamariam, Sophia (2009). Jendayi E. Frazer's 4-point plan to plunder and pillage Africa. Retrieved from: http://freeuganda.wordpress.com/2009/10/29/jendayi-e-frazers-plan-to-plunder-and-pillage-africa/. Accessed on 25 August 2011

Udo, Bassey (2010). Africa Spends N3.3 trillion annually on food import. *Africa Investor*. Retrieved from: http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=6528. Accessed on 20 August 2011.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2007) *Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world.* Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

UNEP/GRID-Arendal (2009). *Climate in Peril: A Popular Guide to the Latest IPCC Reports*. Arenda, Norway: UNEP/GRID-Arendal.

UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) (2010). *Economic report on Africa 2010: Promoting high-level sustainable growth to reduce unemployment in Africa.* Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development) (1987) *Our Common Future* Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Wikipedia (nd) Sustainable development. Retrieved from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_development. Accessed on 5 February 2013.

World Bank (2010). *World development report 2010: development and climate change. Washington DC:* The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.

Worthy, Murray, World Development Movement, Jones, Tim. and Jubilee Debt Campaign (2011). Climate loan sharks: how the UK is making developing countries pay twice for climate change. Retrieved from: http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/default/files/Climate%20Loan%20Sharks%20_FINAL%20web%20copy.pdf. Accessed on 24 August 2011.

Zoellick, B. Robert (2010) "Foreword". In *World development report 2010: Development and climate change.* Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Agaptus Nwozor (Ph.D) is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu Aran, Kwara State, Nigeria.